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 In December 1889, Dr. Walter Wyman of the United States Marine Hospital Service 
penned a letter noting that the decommissioned revenue cutter the E.A. Stevens could be a 
“temporary shelter hospital for the relief of the sick and disabled [oystermen] . . . at the mouth of 
the Patuxent River [Maryland].” Wyman instructed that J.A. Stevens, an engineer, be engaged to 
inspect the Stevens, but that this must be done swiftly for the “vessel must necessarily be put into 
condition with out [sic] delay.” 1 On January 17th, Secretary of the Treasury William Windom 
(1889-1891) transferred the Stevens from the United States Revenue-Marine to the Marine 
Hospital Service.2 Eleven days later it was anchored off Drum Point in the Patuxent River. That 
very day several oystermen came to the “floating hospital,” as the press called it, seeking 
treatment.3 The following year a permanent structure was established in nearby Solomons Island 
in Calvert County, Maryland.4 Relief Stations of the Marine Hospital Service provided care in an 
out-patient capacity (although, some patients would spend a couple of days recovering at the 
facility), while MHS hospitals provided long-term care. 
 
                                                 
1 Walter Wyman, “Letter to Medical Officer in Command, Baltimore,” December 30, 1889, Vol. 74, RG 90. NARA, 
College Park, MD. 
2 Special Dispatch to the Baltimore Sun, “From Washington: The New Postmaster of Baltimore Confirmed Without 
Delay No Objections to Mr. Johnson Reported from Committee and Confirmed the Same Day--Preparing to Occupy 
the New Postoffice--A Floating Hospital for Dredgers,” The Sun (1837-1990), January 17, 1890. 
3 Richard J. Dodds, “In Time of Need--The Solomons ‘Marine Hospital’, 1890-1930,” The Bugeye Times, Quarterly 
Newsletter of the Calvert Marine Museum, Winter 1994, 1; “[No Title],” The Sun, 1876; Calvert Gazette, February 
1, 1890; “Dredgers' Floating Hospital: The Revenue Marine Steamer E A Stevens in a New Role--Port Paragraphs,” 
The Sun (1837-1990), January 6, 1890; “A Floating Infirmery,” Calvert Gazette, January 11, 1890; Feb 17 Special 
Dispatch to the Baltimore Sun Washington, “Medical Aid for Dredgers: Oyster Captains Charged with Avoiding the 
Floating Hospital,” The Sun (1837-1990), February 18, 1890; Sun, “From Washington.” 




Figure 1: A map of Maryland showing major oyster bars, with a cutout showing the Solomons Island area of the 
Patuxent River. The area in the red box is Solomons Island, and Drum Point is in the violet circle. Images from: 
“Maryland’s Historic Oyster Bottom: A Geographic Representation of the Traditional Named Oyster Bars.” 
Maryland Department of Natural Resources. October 1997. 
 
Why, though, was the Marine Hospital Service (MHS) concerned about the medical relief 
of oystermen in Maryland; what were the factors that pushed the MHS to intervene, and what 
prevented the state of Maryland from doing so? 
This thesis will explain what factors led the MHS to provide medical relief to Maryland 
oystermen which occurred in the context of the MHS’s expansion and transition toward 
becoming the Public Health Service. In doing so, it will argue for understanding the Chesapeake 
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Bay as an industrial space in addition to an environmental feature, making use of the ideas put 
forth by Sara Pritchard in Confluences. Pritchard argues that environmental features are also non-
environmental constructions, which she refers to as hybrid spaces.5 Pritchard examines the 
Rhône River in France as an environmental technology—the use of the river, for example, to run 
nuclear power plants made the Rhône a technology for nuclear engineers—this thesis will 
consider the Chesapeake Bay as an industrial area of production in addition to being an 
environmental space.6 This industrial/economic understanding constructed a lens through which 
policymakers viewed the Chesapeake Bay. Likewise, this thesis will make use of the argument 
put forth by Pritchard and Thomas Zeller in “The Nature of Industrialization” that economic 
spaces, and especially industrialized spaces, in the nineteenth century cannot escape their 
connection to nature, or the nature of their geography. 7 Industrialization altered, but did not 
change humanity’s connection to nature; textile mills still used cotton (a plant product) which 
never lost its natural qualities, and coal (another plant product) powered nineteenth century 
society.8 Though the Bay was an economic area, it was also an environmental feature. The Bay 
was not just brackish because salt and fresh water mixed; it was brackish because of the mixture 
of man and nature. 
Congruently, this thesis will explore the growing importance of medical 
professionalization in the late nineteenth century United States. It will make heavy use of Paul 
                                                 
5 Sara B. Pritchard, Confluence : The Nature of Technology and the Remaking of the Rhône (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2011). 
6 Ibid., 4–7. Different groups used the Rhône for different technological ends, and this influenced how they viewed 
the hybridization of the Rhône. Thus, farmers had a much different conception of the river as a technology than 
nuclear engineers; these multiple technological uses of the river meant he Rhone became a contested enviro-tech 
space.  
7 Thomas Zeller and Sara Pritchard, “The Nature of Industrialization,” in The Illusory Boundary Environment and 
Technology in History, ed. Martin Reuss and Stephen H. Cutcliffe (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia 
Press, 2010). 




Starr’s focus on the medical profession’s cultural authority resulting from reforms during the last 
half of the nineteenth century.9 By the end of the nineteenth century Progressive reformers were 
starting to scrape away at the lethargy of the Gilded Age by pressing for more interventionist 
government regulations and programs. This movement started at the local level and clawed its 
way up the federalized power structure in the United States.10 This thesis will expand upon the 
notion that the federal government did not take an entirely hands-off approach to public health 
during the Gilded Age. By examining the stances taken by the Maryland government and that of 
the MHS in specific relation to oyster dredgers it will show that the federal government was in 
fact involved in providing medical relief whereas the state was not. This thesis will also highlight 
the important role played by the newly professionalized medical bureaucracy in developing 
public policy by examining the creation of the MHS Relief Station in Solomons Island.  
The last half of the nineteenth century was particularly formative for the American 
medical profession. The cultural authority assigned to unbiased experts in medicine paralleled 
the changes that were occurring within the wider cultural fabric of the United States.11 The 
combination of professionalism and authority was most prominent in the twentieth century as a 
result of the momentum built by late nineteenth  century reforms. This authority and 
independence granted agencies greater self-determination over the allocation of their resources. 
This does not mean that every agency charged forward with New Deal zeal, but that a 
                                                 
9 Paul Starr, The Social Transformation of American Medicine (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1982), 13-15. –
Cultural authority is where authority is granted to an institution through its ability to construct truth through 
defining facts. This is contrasted to social authority which is simply the ability to giver orders. Cultural authority is 
exercised in an indirect manner, and more importantly, is in the case of professionalization used as a base for social 
authority. 
10 Morton. Keller, Affairs of State : Public Life in Late Nineteenth Century America (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press 
of Harvard University Press, 1977); Theda. Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers : The Political Origins of 
Social Policy in the United States (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1992); John Duffy, 
The Sanitarians : A History of American Public Health (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1992). 
11 Edwin T. Layton, The Revolt of the Engineer: Social Responsibility and the American Engineering Profession 
(Cleveland, OH: Press of Case Western Reserve University, 1971). 
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bureaucracy’s self-understanding of its mission decided how its authority would be applied. The 
oystermen of Maryland faced some significant health dangers that the Maryland Board of Health 
did not consider within their purview. The MHS, however, did consider providing medical relief 
to oystermen to be part of their expanding prerogative. This thesis argues that professional 
government agencies played a significant role in deciding how the government would react to 
industrial health problems, a role defined by an agency’s understanding of its mission.  
Connected to this, the thesis will show the influences of late nineteenth century ideas of 
industrial safety limited the liability of employers and controlled how the state of Maryland 
chose to react to the health risks faced by oyster dredgers. As is shown by Morton Keller and 
Arwen Mohun, the fellow servant rule, doctrine of assumed risk, and contributory negligence 
severely limited the legal avenues a worker could navigate to received compensation for an 
injury.12 In essence, these ideas served to place the loci of responsibility for safety on the 
employee, not the employer. In Affairs of State, Keller demonstrates that many judges and 
legislatures held a “pro-employer bias” and were also concerned about the “social disorder” that 
would arise if workers could sue employers for damages.13 These factors made it extremely 
difficult for workers to receive any relief, medical or financial, from injuries suffered in their 
place of employment. On the Chesapeake Bay, the only cases of an oyster dredger successfully 
                                                 
12 Keller, Affairs of State; Arwen Mohun, Risk : Negotiating Safety in American Society (Baltimore, MD: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2013). Contributory Negligence: an employee could not claim compensation form an 
employer for an injury if the said employee was found to be negligent in his actions. Doctrine of Assumed Risk: an 
employee, upon accepting employment, assumed all the risks associated with said employment. Fellow Servant 
Rule: an employer is not held liable for an employee’s injury if another employee’s negligence is found to have 
caused the first employee’s injury. (Steven Gifis, Dictionary of Legal Terms : A Simplified Guide to the Language of 
Law. Hauppauge, N.Y.: Barron's Educational Series, Inc, 1998.) 
13 Keller, Affairs of State, 404. 
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receiving recompense for an injury were in cases where skipjack captains assaulted a hand.14  In 
cases of industrial injury, oyster dredgers had no legal recourse to acquire medical aid. 
Though John Wennersten, Christine Keiner, and Andrew Habermacher have all written 
about the health of oystermen, it has either been as an aside (in the case of Wennersten and 
Keiner) or not in a historical context (Habermacher’s 1986 work focused on contemporary 
oystermen). Studying the roles of bureaucracies adds to the historiography of industrial health by 
helping to understand how the government provided for the health of workers. The focus of both 
the State Board of Health for Maryland and MHS was instrumental in deciding how these 
bureaucracies understood industrial health problems. Importantly, this thesis will suggest that 
historians should have some elasticity when looking at the role of the federal government in 
health. Additionally, where most books looking at federal action on health focus on politics and 
interest groups, this thesis will show that a largely apolitical professional agency acted to provide 
medical care to individuals that were not receiving any relief. This thesis will add to the 
historiography of the enlargement of the federal government by showing that the federal 
bureaucracy intervened in industrial health before the Progressive reforms of the twentieth 
century. 
Chapter I provides a historical background to the Maryland oyster industry. In particular, 
it highlights the importance of the industry to Maryland’s economy and politics. It also 
differentiates between the two methods of oyster harvesting (tonging and dredging) and notes 
why such a distinction is important to industrial health. 
Chapter II looks at how the government of Maryland responded to this and explores the 
creation of the Maryland Board of Health and its focus on establishing a professionalized class of 
                                                 
14 Correspondence of the Baltimore Sun, “The State of Maryland Oystermen Complain of Cruel 
Treatment: Warrants Issued at Annapolis Two Arrests for Illegal Dredging--Marriage of the Rev. John P. Campbell 
at Salisbury--Fatal Accident In Frederick County,” The Sun (1837-1990), February 28, 1890. 
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physicians in the state. In explaining why Maryland failed to react to the oysterman health gap 
this chapter will highlight the Board of Health’s preoccupation with providing for general 
sanitation over specialized medical care. This chapter will also show how the state’s view of 
oyster dredgers influenced its reaction to the health problems dredgers faced. 
Chapter III will explore the expansion of the Marine Hospital Service. In doing so, it will 
show that the MHS leveraged the new professionalization of the medical profession in the late 
nineteenth century to build a momentum of expansion throughout the nation. This 
professionalism, coupled with its sympathetic view of the plight faced by oyster dredgers, 
















Chapter 1: The Chesapeake Bay, the Oyster, and the Oyster Dredger 
  
The Chesapeake Bay is the main geographic feature of Maryland and has played a 
prominent role in Maryland’s economy. In addition to serving as an entry point for foreign and 
domestic trade via the Baltimore Harbor, the Chesapeake was a major fishery in the nineteenth 
and much of the twentieth centuries. So significant were the Bay’s resources that many 
contemporaries and historians have called it an “immense protein factory,” this is perhaps one of 
the few instances where such an adjective is not a hyperbole.15 The oyster industry in late 
nineteenth century Maryland was one of the largest industries in the state.16 During the sector’s 
peak, in the 1880s, it employed one-fifth of the state’s workforce and produced one-third of the 
world’s oysters.17 The income for the state generated by the industry was less impressive due to 
the low tax rate on oystering; in 1894, for example, the Treasury received fifty thousand dollars 
while spending fifty-four thousand to collect that money. It is important to bear in mind that the 
state only received tax money from dredging vessels. Dredgers were taxed on the tonnage of the 
skipjack (in 1894 that was a rate of five dollars per ton with skipjacks averaging 22 tons), along 
with a small tax on each bushel harvested. This tax was paid directly to the state.18 On the other 
hand, tongers paid their taxes to the counties.19 
                                                 
15 John Capper, Garrett. Power, and Frank R. Shivers, Chesapeake Waters: Pollution, Public Health, and Public 
Opinion, 1607-1972, (Centreville, MD: Tidewater Publishers, 1983), 76. 
16 Shipping accounted for a decent percentage of the economy—and today the Port of Baltimore is still vital, with 5 
billion dollars of good passing through it in 2015. With the completion of the Baltimore and Ohio Rail Road in 
1845, the city became a “commercial gateway.” (“Port of Baltimore, Maryland,” accessed February 9, 2017, 
http://msa.maryland.gov/msa/mdmanual/01glance/html/port.html.) 
17 Christine Keiner, The Oyster Question: Scientists, Watermen, and the Maryland Chesapeake Bay since 1880, 
(Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2010), 36. 
18 Charles H. Stevenson, "The Oyster Industry of Maryland.’ in, Sixth Biennial Report for the Bureau of Industrial 
Statistics and Information of Maryland, 1894-’95, (pp: 270-385), 1895, Courtesy of the Maryland State Archives. 
19 Maryland is unique among the states in that its power structure is highly devolved.  
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This dispersion in tax collection was a result of the Maryland General Assembly dividing 
the Bay’s topography into specific production zones of state and county waters in 1865, with 
each area designated for a specific and specialized method of oyster extraction. Dredging (also 
called scraping) consisted of a mechanical apparatus attached to a skipjack to scrape oysters from 
the bottom of the Bay, could only be done in state waters.20  Tonging relied on using a hand tool, 
tongs, to gather oysters and was limited to county waters. County waters were defined as the area 
within three hundred yards of the shore during low tide. Considering this labor division by space 
and action, it is easy to conceptualize the Bay as a constructed industrial space much like a 
standard industrial factory, with areas dedicated to specific production techniques and each with 
their specific technologies. However, more to the point for contemporaries, the Bay also 
produced oysters at such a high rate that its output was almost like a factory. On the Chesapeake 
dredging was similar to factory work, requiring little professional skill and conducted on a 
contractual basis. Tonging, however, operated under a preindustrial system where each tonger 
was his own boss and owner of his equipment. Dredgers were paid a seasonal wage, receiving 
their salary regardless of whether the haul was large or small. Tongers earned money based on 
how many bushels they harvested.  Each occupational type presented a similar, but also unique, 
set of health and safety problems.  
 Few works have exclusively addressed the health of oystermen, and none have done so as 
history. Examinations of oystermen health are part of  wider historical examination. In his 1986 
anthropology dissertation, Andrew Habermacher examines the life, including healthcare, of 
contemporary oystermen in Somerset County, and includes a chapter that provides a historical 
                                                 
20 Skipjacks were designed specifically to dredge for oysters. They had large sails to take full advantage of the wind 
and were low to the water to make it easier to pull dredges onto the deck. A more detailed description may be found 
in the glossary. 
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context.21  He found that even in 1986 Maryland’s Eastern Shore had few medical facilities, and 
those that were present lacked the equipment to treat serious injuries and diseases forcing the 
infirm to travel to Baltimore.  
 It would be imprudent to discuss the historiography of the Chesapeake without 
mentioning John Wennersten.  His 2001 book The Chesapeake is a biography of the 
environmental feature starting from pre-European usage and finishing with conservation efforts 
at the end of the twentieth century. In The Chesapeake, Wennersten examines human 
interactions with the Chesapeake, including the oyster industry’s impact on the Bay. This 
environmental history includes glimpses of the dangers faced by Chesapeake oystermen. 
Wennersten’s “The All Mighty Oyster” and The Oyster Wars of the Chesapeake are more 
targeted examinations of the oyster industry.22 In “The All Mighty Oyster,” Wennersten looks 
specifically at the central role Maryland’s expanded railroad network played in allowing the 
oyster industry to boom. The Oyster Wars follows the Maryland Oyster Navy, a poorly equipped 
fleet of decommissioned Naval and Coast Guard vessels that attempted to prevent oyster 
poaching, keep the peace between dredgers and tongers, and stop Virginians from harvesting 
oysters in Maryland waters.23  
                                                 
21 Andrew Lee Habermacher, “Work and Health of the Chesapeake Bay Commercial Fishermen of Somerset 
County, Maryland” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Florida, 1986), http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UF00103067/00001.-- For 
oysterman of the twentieth century, skin cancer, cuts—and subsequent infection—of the hand, cold/flu, back 
problems, and body trauma were the most common health concerns. (163-195) For more detailed breakdown, 
including divergent views of health risk between oystermen and medical provides, see pages 186-194. 
22 John R. Wennersten, “The All Mighty Oyster: A Saga of Old Somerset and the Eastern Shore, 1850-1920,” 
Maryland Historical Magazine 74, no. 1 (March 1979): 80–93; John R. Wennersten, The Oyster Wars of 
Chesapeake Bay, 1st ed. (Centreville, MD: Tidewater Publishers, 1981). 
23 Wennersten, The Oyster Wars of Chesapeake Bay, 1981, 122–27.— The term “oyster war” is worthy, with gunfire 
frequently exchanged on the Bay, between oyster policemen and oystermen, dredgers and tongers, and Marylanders 
and Virginians. The death of Berkley Muse in 1959 at the hands of a trigger-happy police force prompted Maryland 
and Virginia to create a bi-state commission to settle the matter of oyster poaching between the two states. Prior to 
this the state could be said to be in a quasi-war, with the governors of each state going as so far as to public 
denounce his counterpart. Poachers would be arrested by their respective state law enforcement agencies, and given 
a slap on the wrist.  
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In The Oyster Wars, and to a lesser extent The Chesapeake, Wennersten also describes 
the unique culture of Tidewater, and especially Eastern Shore, oystermen. In “Landscapes of 
Resistance,” Bradford Botwick and Debra McClane delve deeper into the culture of the 
oysterman by differentiating between the preindustrial tongers and the industrialized dredging 
fleet.24 They show that in Maryland oystering had two different labor systems. Christine 
Keiner’s The Oyster Question furthers this examination of the oyster industry.25 Her examination 
is less concerned with the culture of the oysterman and instead focuses on Maryland’s attempts 
to govern the oyster commons. The “oyster question” was whether the oyster beds should be a 
common resource or if they should be privatized. Keiner’s focus is on the confrontation between 
Annapolis-appointed scientific experts and the politically empowered rural oystermen. The 
scientists advocated for a privatized farming method, which would allow for better scientific 
management of the resource, while oystermen fought to defend their economic independence 
through keeping the grounds public.  
That oyster dredgers faced health hazards has been hinted at by historians, but not fully 
fleshed out as the main focus of a historical study. This is not to say they ignore the plight of the 
oyster dredger— Wennersten and Keiner each dedicate a chapter to examining the industry and 
its workforce— but the hazards faced by oystermen were tangential to the larger historical 
examination.26 This thesis is primarily concerned with the workers in this agricultural assembly 
line, and how the government at the state and federal level chose to interact with them. However, 
to understand this, we must first understand the Chesapeake Bay and the Maryland oyster 
industry.  
                                                 
24 Bradford Botwick and Debra A. McClane, “Landscapes of Resistance: A View of the Nineteenth-Century 
Chesapeake Bay Oyster Fishery,” Historical Archaeology 39, no. 3 (2005): 94–112. 
25 Keiner, The Oyster Question, 2010.  
26 Ibid., chap. 1; Wennersten, The Chesapeake, chap. 4; Wennersten, The Oyster Wars of Chesapeake Bay, chap. 1, 
3, & 5 
12 
 
The Chesapeake  
The oyster industry was one of three main phases of fishery extraction that occurred in 
the Chesapeake Bay following colonization. The first major fishery extraction phase was the 
harvesting of chordates, notably herring, shad, and rockfish (striped bass) and started in the end 
of the eighteenth century and ran until a decade or two after the Civil War. With a catch of 25 
million shad and a stunningly high yield of 750 million herring in 1835, returns continued to be 
impressive until a bottoming out near the end of the nineteenth century. In 1878, for example, the 
catches from both shad and herring were about one one-hundredth of that in 1835.27  The 
harvesting of Callinectes sapidus, the famous Maryland Blue Crab, accounts for the third fishery 
phase. The crabbing industry began in the early twentieth century and peaked by the 1980s, with 
hauls of around 50,000 tons.28  
Straddling these two phases is Crassostrea virginica. Commonly referred to as the 
Eastern Oyster, harvest of the Crassostrea virginica began in earnest after the Civil War and 
peaked in the 1870s and 1880s, with hauls of 14 million bushels in 1874 and 15 million in 1885 
marking start and finish of this high plateau. In that interceding decade hauls never fell below 10 
million bushels.29   
For centuries the oyster represented an accessible and sustainable source of protein for 
those that resided along the Chesapeake. The Algonquin-speaking peoples that lived along the 
Great Shellfish Bay’s (Chesepiook) many tributaries, estimated to have numbered from 30,000 to 
45,000 people by the time of European contact, would harvest oysters to fill the winter months’ 
                                                 
27 Philip D. Curtin, Grace S. Brush, and George W. Fisher, Discovering the Chesapeake: The History of an 
Ecosystem (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 204-207. 
28 Ibid., 207. 
29 John R. Wennersten, The Chesapeake: An Environmental Biography (Baltimore, MD: Maryland Historical 
Society, 2001), 128; Keiner, The Oyster Question, 38. 
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protein gap.30 By virtue of their low population density, Native American impact on the oyster 
population was negligible. “Intensive harvesting of shellfish, for example, may have depleted 
specific places, but prehistoric oyster shells do not normally display the significant size reduction 
that indicates over-harvesting.”31 The oyster population in the Bay before the Civil War was 
astounding; its oysters could filter the entire Chesapeake Bay in a few days—that is over 18 
trillion gallons of water!32 Today, it takes almost a year.33 So abundant was the oyster that their 
beds posed threats to ships, and forced many a captain to navigate the Bay and its tributaries 
carefully. Traveling far from the peaks and valleys of his native Switzerland in the 
eighteenth century, Francis Louis Michel commented that:  
The abundance of oysters is incredible. There are whole banks of them so that the ships 
must avoid them. A sloop, which was to land us at Kingscreek, struck an oyster bed, 
where we had to wait about two hours for the tide. They surpass those in England by far 
in size, indeed; they are four times as large. I often cut them in two, before I could put 
them into my mouth.34 
 
Little did Michel realize the peaks and valleys he would have recognized from his homeland 
were under the brown-green waters of the Chesapeake.   
During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, however, oysters did not account for 
much of the nutritional load of Marylanders, except for slaves and poor whites during the winter 
months.35 However, in the nineteenth century, with land prices rising due to the plantation 
system, many poor whites turned to the water for their livelihood “by working in shipyards, like 
                                                 
30 Curtin, Brush, and Fisher, Discovering the Chesapeake, 121. 
31 Ibid., 123. 
32 Lynch , et al. “Understanding the Estuary: Advances in Chesapeake Bay Research,” in Understanding the 
Estuary : Advances in Chesapeake Bay Research (Solomons, MD : Chesapeake Research Consortium, 1988), 539; 
“Chesapeake Bay Facts and Figures,” Maryland Sea Grant, April 27, 2013, 
http://www.mdsg.umd.edu/topics/ecosystems-restoration/chesapeake-bay-facts-and-figures. 
33 Keiner, The Oyster Question, 2010, 30. 
34 James Wharton, The Bounty of the Chesapeake: Fishing in Colonial Virginia, (Charlottesville, VA: University of 
Virginia Press, 1957), 35. 
35 Oyster season, as practiced by Native Americans, colonist, and nineteeth century watermen, was during the winter 
(the “r” months).  
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those in Chestertown and Oxford, or by catching herring and oysters.”36 During the American 
Revolution, they sided with the British, getting revenge for the past—real and imagined—
humiliations heaped upon them by the arrogant Maryland gentry through serving as brokers and 
privateers.37  
This independence and rejection of elites solidified as a tradition of rugged individualism 
and suspicion of outsiders.38 Before the Civil War, most families subsisted on a diverse spread of 
crops—corn, wheat, and tobacco—supplemented with logging; oyster yields were at only about 
500,000 bushels yearly (about 50,000,000 oysters).39 In point of fact, the first dedicated oyster 
harvesters did not come from Maryland, but were New England seafood industrialists who had 
already depleted the oyster beds of the Long Island Sound.  The arrival of these dredging 
invaders in the 1830s laid the foundation for the enmity between the tonger and dredger.40 The 
state limited oystering to Maryland residents in 1820.41 This encouraged many New England 
seafood interests to move their base of operations to Maryland (either Baltimore or Crisfield), 
starting with Caleb S. Maltby, who moved from Fairhaven to Baltimore in 1836.42 By 1850, 
there were six packing houses in Baltimore, and the harvest for that year raked in a respectable 
1.3 million bushels.43  
                                                 
36 Wennersten, The Oyster Wars of Chesapeake Bay, 1981, 7. 
37 Ibid., 7–9. 
38 Christopher P. White, Skipjack : The Story of America’s Last Sailing Oystermen (New York, NY: St. Martin’s 
Press, 2009), 364. 
39 A bushel generally had about 100 oysters. 
40 Keiner, The Oyster Question, 35; White, Skipjack.—Even as late as the 1990s, the twilight years of the oyster 
industry, there was a strong culture of distrust between dredge boat captains and tongers, with Skipjacks raiding 
grounds reserved for tongers.  
41 Keiner, The Oyster Question, 35. 
42 Wennersten, The Chesapeake, 111; Wennersten, The Oyster Wars of Chesapeake Bay, 13; Bradford Botwick and 
Debra A. McClane, “Landscapes of Resistance," 94–112; Habermacher, Andrew Lee.  “Work and Health of the 
Chesapeake Bay Commercial Fishermen of Somerset County, Maryland: " It's a Hard Life, Honey!"”. PhD diss. 
University of Florida, 1986. 
43. Habermacher, “Work and Health of the Chesapeake Bay Commercial Fishermen of Somerset County, 
Maryland,” 63.—Bushels would generally yield about 100 to 150 oysters; weighing about 60 pounds.  
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The Civil War served to limit any expansion in the industry, but thanks to the 
infrastructural investments from the war the industry took off after Appomattox. Stimulated by 
the extension of the railroads, oyster harvesting grew to be the vanguard of a fifty million dollar 
seafood industry, an industry that, thanks to the refrigerated railway car and canning, was able to 
send the Eastern Oyster all the way to the Rocky Mountains.44 By 1870, there were 563 licensed 
dredgers in Maryland and about twice as many tongers.45 However, this number fails to capture 
the true extent of the oyster industry as many dredgers operated illegally, either by living in 
Virginia or hiding amongst the many shanty towns that dotted the inlets and coves along the 
eastern Chesapeake Bay. Thus, the number of actual skipjacks plowing the Bay was probably 
closer to one thousand.46 By 1890, almost one-fourth of the workforce in Maryland (about 
30,000 persons) worked in the oyster industry, with 4,500 boats plowing the waters of the Bay 
and its tributaries.47 However, beginning in the 1890s harvests began to decrease due to over-
extraction, with the 1920s seeing hauls of only 2 million bushels.48 Maryland’s oyster population 
has in recent years begun a slow reclamation, though there is a long way to go before the oyster 
population returns to what it was before the mid-nineteenth century.49 
This was an industry that did not just support towns financially; in some case towns were 
literally supported by oysters. Solomons Island in Southern Maryland is nearly connected to the 
mainland of Calvert County by a causeway of oyster shells. Sections of the city of Crisfield are 
built on a “solid area of oyster shells.”50 By producing one-third of the world’s oysters, 
                                                 
44 Wennersten, The Oyster Wars of Chesapeake Bay, chap. 1 . 
45 Ibid., 27. 
46 Wennersten, The Chesapeake, 2001, 119. 
47 Ibid., 114.  
48 Curtin, Brush, and Fisher, Discovering the Chesapeake, 210–211. The first record of an oyster harvest in 
Maryland dates from 1839, and puts the haul at about 700,000 bushels.  
49 Keiner, The Oyster Question, 2010, 29–35. 
50 W. Wyman, “Hardships of the Coasting Trade, and Particularly of the Chesapeake Bay Oystermen,” Public 
Health Papers and Reports, Vol. 10 (1884): 273. 
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employing thousands of people, and bringing in millions of dollars to the state, the industry was 
exceedingly important to the state’s economic fortunes. The oyster was so central to the state that 
in 1912 the City of Baltimore developed and paid for a water treatment system to protect the 
oyster population—not the health of its populace.51  
 
 
                                                 




Figure 2: A map showing the Chester and Potomac Rivers. Solomons Island is circled in violet and Crisfield is in red. Images from: “Maryland’s 







Oysters proliferate in the brackish water of the Chesapeake; in particular, the area 
between the Chester and Potomac rivers (fig. 2) offer an ideal environment for their growth.52 
With a preference for hard surfaces, and given that their larvae cannot travel far, oysters tend to 
coalesce into colonies, called beds. Larvae will search the seafloor for a suitable nesting location, 
attaching to a hard surface such as rocks, clam shells, or other oysters, where it will then spend 
the rest of its life—which can be as long as twenty years.53 The density can vary considerably 
but range from 500 to 1,000 oysters per square meter.54 Formed into beds which used to stretch 
along the Chesapeake Bay, it is hard not to see why oystering would be an attractive business 
venture and, eventually, become central to Maryland’s economic life. 
 
Figure 3: "Oyster Life Cycle.” South Carolina Oyster Restoration and Enhancement Program. 
http://score.dnr.sc.gov/deep.php?subject=2&topic=15  
                                                 
52 Keiner, The Oyster Question, 30;  “Oysters - Fish Facts - Chesapeakebay.noaa.gov,” accessed April 5, 2016, 
http://chesapeakebay.noaa.gov/fish-facts/oysters. The optimal salinity range for eastern oysters is 14-28 practical 
salinity units (a measurement based on conductivity). Brackish water can range between 1 to 29 psu. The region 
between the Chester and Potomac rivers--an area running from the Chesapeake Bay Bridge to the southern tip of 
Maryland's western shore--prove to be conducive to oyster growth, while also serving to limit the presence of 
predators and diseases. This held true until the 1960s when Haplosporidium nelsoni (often called MSX, a protozoa 
that is highly lethal to oysters) struck. For further information on the negative influences of MSX on the Maryland 
oyster industry see: Christopher P. White, Skipjack : The Story of America’s Last Sailing Oystermen (New York, 
NY: St. Martin's Press, 2009). 
53 “Crassostrea Virginica,” accessed March 4, 2016, http://www.sms.si.edu/IRLSpec/Crassostrea_virginica.htm.--





As has been mentioned, there were two methods for harvesting oysters: tonging and 
dredging. The tong is the archetypal instrument of the oysterman and consisted of a twelve to 
eighteen-foot handle that supported a wide mouth that acted as a sort of salad tongs of the 
water.55  
 
Figure 4: “Oyster Tongs.” Drawing. Retrieved from the Library at The Mariners' Museum. 
https://www.marinersmuseum.org/sites/micro/cbhf/oyster/mod007.html 
 
Figure 5: Oyster tongers fishing from side of boat, Chesapeake Bay, Md., U.S.A. Chesapeake Bay Maryland Virginia, ca. 1905. Photograph. 
Retrieved from the Library of Congress, https://www.loc.gov/item/2003688544/. 
                                                 
55 “On the Water - Fishing for a Living, 1840-1920: Commercial Fishers > Chesapeake Oysters,” accessed March 4, 
2016, http://americanhistory.si.edu/onthewater/exhibition/3_5.html.  
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Tongs would be used to scoop oysters from a shallow bed; a tong filled with oysters, 
rocks, and mud could weigh up to sixty pounds, which explains why many tongers suffered 
hernias and chronic back pain.56 In general, tonging boats had small crews, generally only two, 
and occasionally four, men. One person would use the tongs to harvest the oysters, dropping the 
tongs vertically into the water to scoop a catch of oyster off the seabed. The second oysterman, 
called the culler, would proceed to break apart and sort the oyster colonies. After a while, the 
culler and tonger would switch places.57  
The other method of oyster extraction was dredging (fig. 6 & 7), which was done on the 
famous Maryland skipjack. In 1825 Maryland banned dredging to protect tonging interest. After 
the Civil War, in 1865, in response to growing demand from the canning and railroad industries 
to open the Chesapeake’s vast protein deposits, the General Assembly legalized dredging, but 
regulated the practice to “minimize disruptions to traditional tidewater communities [tongers].” 
Tongers, then, enjoyed a longer season than dredgers. Most importantly, steam power was 
prohibited a “stipulation that further caused conservation and maximal human employment,” this 
technological limitation “curbed the [dredging] industry’s expansion.”58 Because of this the 
skipjack was designed to best use the Bay’s environmental conditions and Maryland’s 
technological restrictions. With a low freeboard (the distance from the water line to the deck), a 
long beam (the widest section of the boat, on skipjacks this ran about one-third its length), a 
centerboard (retractable keel), and a large two sail mast the skipjack was perfectly designed to 
dredge for oysters. The freeboard allowed easy access to the water. The broad beam and 
centerboard increased stability. The retractable centerboard allowed skipjacks to enter shallow 
waters. The large rigging allowed skipjacks to take full advantage of the wind as well. 
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57 Wennersten, The Oyster Wars of Chesapeake Bay, 1981, 28–35. 




Figure 6: Two-sail Bateau "Skipjack", Dogwood Harbor, Chesapeake Bay, Tilghman, Talbot County, MD. Maryland Talbot County Tilghman, 
1968. Documentation Compiled After. Photograph. Retrieved from the Library of Congress, https://www.loc.gov/item/md1454/. (Accessed 
March 15, 2017.) 
 
Figure 7: Two-Sail Bateau E. C. COLLIER, Chesapeake Bay Maritime Museum, Mills Street, Saint Michaels, Talbot County, MD. Maryland 
Saint Michaels Talbot County, 1968. Documentation Compiled After. Photograph. Retrieved from the Library of Congress, 





Typically, a skipjack would have two dredges, and each dredge was operated by a 
windlass and crewed by four men. It was backbreaking work, as motorization of the dredge 
windlass was not allowed until 1906.59 Thus, before the twentieth century, the harvesting of 
oysters was conducted under wind and muscle power alone. However, it still relied on several 
layers of technology. The windlass itself was made of iron and comprised a gear system which 
multiplied the strength of a man, allowing someone to wind in a haul several times above what 
could have done without this technology. The dredge was also constructed of iron and connected 
to the skipjack via a chain.60 Regardless of these technologies, dredging was still a grueling way 








                                                 
59 Wennersten, The Chesapeake, 2001, 119; Keiner, The Oyster Question, 2010, 15.—The General Assembly 
banned motorization of, or on, oystering skipjacks in 1860.  These was an attempt to both preserve labor, and 
provide some minimal conservation of the oyster beds. 




Figure 9: The oyster war in Chesapeake Bay. March 1, 1884. Drawing. Retrieved from the Library of Congress, 
https://www.loc.gov/item/2002698359/. 
 
Maryland state officials protected both labor and nature when they divided the 
Chesapeake into county and state waters.61 In the shallows of the Bay, oysters were harvested by 
the preindustrial methods of tongers. As the owners of their tools, tongers were yeomen of the 
water. Each tonger had to rely on his knowledge of the Bay and its oysters.62 Where dredging 
was an industry of scale, the size of a harvest relying on a skipjack’s ability to cover a large area, 
tonging did not have such a technological advantage. Dredges could pull in loads (of mud, rock, 
and hopefully oysters) weighing hundreds of pounds; a tong might grab sixty pounds a load. The 
commitment of energy for a tonger, then, resulted in a much lower return on investment than 
dredging. Tongers needed to leverage an “intuition about the resource” to be successful.63 
Tongers could, supposedly, even differentiate between oysters and rock simply through touch.64 
Tongers had to use their understanding of environmental patterns to compete against the 
                                                 
61 Keiner, The Oyster Question, 30–50.-- In 1830, Maryland divided the Chesapeake into state and county waters. 
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62 Ibid., 40–45 and 52–56. 
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64 Ibid., 95–96. 
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dredgers. Where tongers were “artisans,” dredgers used “industrial techniques for harvesting . . . 
as well as for organizing labor, capital, and technology.”65 
 Millard Tawes (Governor of Maryland 1959-1967) shows the harshness of the industry 
in reminiscing about his father: “[He] lasted exactly one day on that dredge boat before he quit. It 
was inhuman work and my father was not about to ruin himself for oysters.”66 The oyster season 
started in October and ended in April, with the day starting before sunrise and running until 
sunset. Dredgers would often spend the whole work week on the water, leaving Monday and 
returning Friday; tongers could return to land each evening. With a peak in prices in November 
in preparation for Christmas, the work of an oysterman left him exposed to the elements.67  The 
limitations of the season left many men’s (and women’s, for women made up about one-third of 
the workforce in Maryland’s many packing houses) financial security at the mercy of the 
elements.68 A harsh freeze could put a financial squeeze on many boat captains, and imperil the 
lives of many hands. The cold, the wind, and the rain along with the harsh working conditions all 
did much to break the oysterman’s health.69  
 
The cold and damp of the Bay prematurely aged men, and in water-locked hamlets like 
Crisfield, Cambridge, and Oxford, the most noticeable characteristics of watermen were 
iron-grey hair and a deeply lined brow. In countless water-front saloons men complained 





                                                 
65 Ibid., 96 & 95. 
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In the nineteenth century, the Maryland General Assembly’s apportionment favored rural 
counties over urban areas. The State Senate comprised twenty-six senators, one from each 
county and three from Baltimore City. The House of Delegates awarded seats to the counties by 
population, but each county (and the Baltimore City which is not a county, but functioned as 
one) had at least three and a maximum of six delegates.71 By leveraging this rurally skewed 
legislative apportionment, tongers and oyster captains were able to maintain their economic 
hegemony and head off Progressive Era conservationist intervention.72 However, these labor-
preserving rules—preservation of access to labor, not the laborers themselves—also exposed 
tonger and dredgers to greater health hazards. In limiting the range of dredging vessels protected 
oyster beds and preserved the livelihood of the rurally located tongers. By restricting dredging 
vessels to wind and muscle power, Maryland was keeping the oyster industry open to a large 
number of men by preventing the dredging industry from becoming fully mechanized. 
Simultaneously, the state also engaged in some conservation by making it harder to dredge for 
oysters. As a result, there were a comparatively equal number of men engaging in dredging and 
tonging.73 The eventual introduction of the powered windlasses in 1906, reduced the number of 
men employed by dredgers, but also reduced the potential for injury by removing one brutal step 
from the dredging process. As a result, “the tyranny of the hand windlass soon became only 
legend on the bay.”74 
To be an oysterman was to be both free and trapped. On the water, tongers escaped from 
the requirements of society and the economic controls of a new industrial and urban America. 
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The men of the Eastern Shore of Maryland prized, above all, their independence. The tongers of 
Crisfield, Cambridge, and Tilghman’s Island were all their own bosses: they owned their 
equipment and thus had greater control over their labor. These were men characterized as both 
thrifty and improvident; for many, this was not an economically fruitful life, but one that 
provided some freedoms not offered in the industrialized economy of nineteenth century 
America.75 Even well into the twentieth century, men, and a few women, felt compelled to 
follow the water; brackish water was in their blood, and the freedom of the Bay was a greater 
reward than financial stability.76  
These were also men who lived in the moment, likely to spend the money from a good 
haul in bars and brothels.77  Life on the water was a life of hard work and significant hazard to 
one’s health, for “[t]he Bay country bred a fierce recklessness in men who pitted their lives 
against the wild elements of the Chesapeake.” Shore-time, then, represented a vacation, a time to 
drink and engage in prostitution, alcohol being “the acme of sensual bliss” for sailors and 
oystermen alike.78 There was a darker side to this freedom. The spendthrift ways of oystermen 
left them open to exploitation and control, for “[in] signing the articles of ship...the sailor [or 
dredger] abdicated control over his person,” this produced an odd paradox where “the sea 
simultaneously represented a passport to freedom and a life akin to slavery.”79 
While Eastern Shore tongers represented a holdover from preindustrial times, dredging 
was an industrial affair. Dredgers, often poor whites, African-Americans (who made up about 
thirty percent of the workforce), or (predominantly German and Irish) immigrants were wage 
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laborers no different from the oyster packers or other factory workers. Where tonging required 
skill, dredging was for the unskilled. Tongers owned their boats and equipment, while dredgers 
were just employees on a skipjack. In fact, packing houses owned many skipjacks, and captains 
of these vessels were simply hired as managers.80 The reality of the dredger’s employment was 
that it was industrial; dredgers worked in factories which floated upon the water, lit not by 
electricity or gas lighting but by the cold morning light of the southern Chesapeake. Lacking 
tonging’s imbrication of man and nature, dredging relied on technology and efficiency to be 
profitable. Dredging was an assembly line for organic processing, defined by iron and muscle 
power.81 The work was physically and psychologically demanding; dredgers not only had to 
brave the elements but also engage in backbreaking labor and always ran the risk of being 
injured or maimed. A dredger manning a windlass was pulling in several hundred pounds of 
rock, mud, and oyster, running the risk of injury due to the strain of the work or a malfunction of 
the equipment.  The culler would have to sort through hundreds of oysters and sharp rocks, 
risking laceration and infection. 
 
Dredging’s Dangers 
In November of 1882, James Belfield was struck in the stomach by his windlass when the 
dredge caught on some submerged obstacle, most likely a rock, knocking him across the boat. He 
landed on his back, badly, and lost the use of his legs.82 Malfunction of the windlass was a 
common way to receive an injury on a skipjack, as noted in William Marsh’s 1893 report from 
Solomons Island: “The kinds of injuries received at this station are those mostly caused by the 
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82 Wyman, “Hardships of the Coasting Trade, and Particularly of the Chesapeake Bay Oystermen,” 279–280. 
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dredge hand crank.”83 Alternatively, one could escape those dangers by being a culler, replacing 
the blunt force trauma of the dredge for the risks of oyster hand, where a laceration caused by the 
razor-sharp shells could become dangerously infected.  One article in The Baltimore Sun from 
August 1876 recounts how  George W. Roberts died after getting tetanus from an injury he 
received on a dredging boat.84 Such infected cuts often required “months of medical treatment” 
to cure.85  
Unfortunately for dredgers, not only did they work in an industry that exposed them to 
many health risks, but they also worked in an industry where abuse was commonplace. 
Complaints of mistreatment occurred rather frequently, though actual prosecutions of captains 
were rare.86 In January 1885, Capitan Edward Crockett of the Anna May was charged with 
murder in the death of Benedict Beck. Beck had expired from lockjaw (tetanus) resulting from 
injuries sustained to his right arm when Crockett assaulted him on December 17th. Subsequently, 
a warrant was issued for his arrest when a coroner’s court concluded their review of the case they 
found Crockett liable for the death.87 This, however, was anomalous, as many captains were 
prominent community leaders, serving in local government and often the friends of judges, and 
rarely would juries bring charges against them.88  
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When labor was abundant, captains had little trouble enticing men, mostly from 
Baltimore, to join their crews, but when labor was scarce, they would have to resort to another 
method of recruitment: shanghaiing.89 The danger of being shanghaied was an open secret in 
Baltimore’s waterfront slums. In her book The Oyster Question, Christine Keiner comments on 
the state of Maryland’s oyster industry and the place of dredgers, noting: “No man was safe 
around the Baltimore waterfront after dark in the R-months.”90  
In January 1885, about 1,500 German-Americans held a meeting in Baltimore’s 
Schlegels Hall with the expressed purpose of petitioning the General Assembly for better 
protections for dredgers. Louis Graf, the chairman of the meeting, opened by stating “You all 
know the atrocities that have been committed on Maryland waters . . . The blood of the fallen 
victims cries out to Heaven for vengeance.”91 The conclusion was that the authorities wanted to 
provide protections to dredgers, but lacked the means to do so.92   
In November 1885, The Baltimore Sun released an editorial stating that “public opinion 
demands” that the General Assembly pass legislation granting protection to oyster dredgers.93 In 
powerful and eloquent language they lay the blame for these abuses not at the feet of the 
captains, but as a result of business conditions which allowed cruelty to flourish. The authors 
called for a law to prevent shanghaiing, going so far as to state that if Maryland did not act, then 
Congress must intervene.94  
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It is hard to tell the true intentions of The Sun’s numerous exposés of the cruelty 
embedded within dredging. To be sure, there is a dramatic hook in all of these stories which 
undoubtedly stimulated readership. With titles like “Suffering of Destitute Dredgers” and “Hung 
up by the Thumbs,” it is easy to see that The Sun was attempting to attract readers with linguistic 
eye candy, but such titles were also accurate characterizations.95 However, it is important to 
remember that within these stories, even with the flashy titles, The Sun was exposing the injuries 
and mistreatments suffered by dredgers. The Sun also has a history of engaging in some limited 
activist reporting. In 1882, the paper challenged Baltimore City’s powerful Democratic machine 
by supporting the “new judge ticket” in that year’s election, despite having been card-carrying 
party supporters in the prior decades.96 So, while there is a possibility that The Sun may have 
been printing these stories simply to boost readership, it is also evident that the paper did engage 
in activist publication. By shedding light on the health risks and mistreatments of dredgers, The 
Sun was also raising awareness of the brutal conditions facing oystermen. 
Most injuries to dredgers came about not by the cruel intentions of skipjack captains, but 
as a result of the nature of dredging and apathy toward workplace safety. Of the 70 oystermen at 
St. Joseph’s Hospital in Baltimore, as reported on January 5, 1885, by The Sun, twenty-five were 
suffering from crank-wounds, frostbite, or “shell-poisoning” (oyster hand).97 On just one day, 
January 28, 1886, Baltimore City’s Bay View Asylum (which, in addition to housing the insane 
also served as an almshouse) had about one-hundred oystermen with frostbite. The day before 
had brought in forty cases of frostbite, with multiple amputations performed, including “W.M. 
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Ford, a hand on the schooner Florence Lee, [commanded by] Capt. Wise, had one toe amputated 
yesterday.”98  
Dangers on an oyster dredger abounded, oyster hand from culling, injuries from falls, 
illness due to exposure, all of these were facts in the life of a dredger. Recall the paralysis of 
James Belfield in November 1882. The accident was not regarded as a unique occurrence, but “a 
day pointed to by the hand of probability.”99 This outlook was in keeping with the occupational 
health theories of the time, which assigned the responsibility of workplace safety with each 
worker.100  The Doctrine of Assumed Risk, Contributory Negligence, and Fellow Servant Rule 
largely absolved management from being held responsible for workplace injuries.101 Walter 
Wyman of the Marine Hospital Service concluded his 1884 report to the American Public Health 
Association that the dangers of oystering are intrinsic to its profession and “no modicum, 
therefore, is directed toward the removal of this risk to life and limb of men whose labor is 
indispensable.”102 The only solution to this problem, then, was to ensure treatment for the injured 
and infirm. “In matters of health, there is no choice but to be our brother’s keeper.”103 
 
Conclusion 
The health hazards—and labor abuse—faced by Maryland’s dredgers did not occur in a 
vacuum. Journalists for The Sun, acting as primordial muckrakers, exposed the plights faced by 
oyster dredgers and called for state action.104 On occasion, the dredgers themselves would 
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engage in collective action, but this was a rarity.105 Their plight also caught the eye of federal 
health authorities, in the person of the Marine Hospital Service’s Dr. Wyman, leading him to call 
for provisions to be made to provide care for oystermen. Wyman’s proposal still operated within 
the confines of the pre-Progressive understanding of occupational health, that injury and disease 
are part-and-parcel to employment: disease, injury, and death on the job were statistical 
probabilities, not anomalies in the Gilded Age.106  
In reports of dredgers’ conditions and calls for health intervention, it is important to note 
that the voice of the dredger is not present but filtered through a middle-class and professional 
synthesizer. Thus, it is possible that there was a distortion of the reality of the dredger’s situation 
and the causal realities of their status were, perhaps, overlooked in the name of journalistic 
advertising or as a byproduct of Gilded Age ambivalence. What is more important in this case is 
not so much that a filter is garbling their voice, but that the filter is allowing anything through. 
Pressure on the state government over the paltry funding for the Board of Health resulted in a 
six-hundred percent increase to its budget a year later.107 That Dr. Wyman called for further 
intervention for the medical relief of dredgers in 1884 shows that aspects of Progressive 
interventionist government policy were starting to form during the Gilded Age.  
The focus of these calls for intervention was on dredging, not tonging. This is a result of 
the industrial/preindustrial dichotomy. Tongers were preindustrial laborers, and the threats they 
faced occurred within the confines of the preindustrial agricultural work they performed. They 
predominantly faced dangers from the weather, which was well beyond human control.108  
Dredging, however, was an industrialized affair. Dredgers were not born and bred oystermen; 
                                                 
105 “Treatment of Dredgers," The Sun. 1885. 
106 John Fabian. Witt, The Accidental Republic : Crippled Workingmen, Destitute Widows, and the Remaking of 
American Law (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 3. 
107 Lloyd, “The Governor's Message," The Sun. 1886. 
108 Mohun, Risk. 
33 
 
they were hired one season at a time. Unlike the tonger, dredgers did not own their equipment 
and lacked the symbiosis with nature that tongers enjoyed.109 Dredging did take place in an 
environment that was not within much human control, but it also took place on skipjacks. 
Skipjacks were constructed to adapt to the environmental and economic stressors of the 
Chesapeake Bay and dredgers faced both environmental and industrial health threats.  
In relying on unskilled wage laborers from dense urban areas, this was an industry that 
appeared very similar to most forms of industrial production. However, this is also an industry 
that was largely at the mercy of weather patterns and water chemistry (that most of all affecting 
the bountifulness of hauls).  The Chesapeake, however, was a natural environment despite 
attempted construction through the regulation of energy (limitations on motorization) and 
geography (division between county/tonger and state/dredging waters). Dredging was an 
industrial style workforce brought from an urban area into a local that was both within human 
control (the skipjack) and outside of human control (the Bay). 110   
Considerations of environmental management ran afoul of economic wants regarding the 
oyster question. Maryland regulated some aspects of the oyster industry, while leaving other 
areas unregulated.111  The methods of extraction were strictly controlled, while the impact of that 
extraction on the body was not regulated. It is the overlap of environment and economics, of 
nature and urban, of preindustrialism and industrialization, which defined the Maryland oyster 
industry. Legislative limits on mechanization checked industrial labor practices. Rural oystermen 
resisted centralized management and privatization of the commons because such changes were 
counter to their economic interest. It is because the Chesapeake is both an environmental and 
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economic landscape that there were so many dangers facing dredgers: they faced the threats of 























Chapter 2: Maryland, Oysters, and Doctors 
 
Maryland’s categorization of what type of work dredging was, along with leading health 
officials’ concept of what role a health agency should play in the state, constricted how the 
government of Maryland responded to the occupational health dangers facing oyster dredgers. 
This action (or, as will be explained, lack of action) was the result of several interwoven factors 
which alone would probably not be enough to prevent state (and local) government action. 
However, combined these forces served to limit Maryland’s response to the oyster dredger’s 
health problems. 
The State Board of Health for Maryland was concerned with collecting reliable vital 
statistics and providing for the sanitary welfare of the whole state rather than caring for a specific 
group. Concurrently, the state was disinclined to intervene into the private economic affairs of 
the oyster industry. The legal concepts of Contributory Negligence, the Doctrine of Assumed 
Risk, and the Fellow Servant Rule guided Gilded Age safety regulations. These legal ideas 
placed the burden of workplace safety on the employee, not the employer.112 Furthermore, the 
state considered it more important to protect the health of the Chesapeake oyster, thereby 
preserving the Maryland oyster industry which employed thousands of individuals and brought 
millions of dollars into the state.113  
 In general, historians’ understanding of the expansion of government involvement in 
providing medical relief has been that local governments, responding to local health crises, were 
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the first to become active in organizing or directing health and sanitation initiatives.114 In part, 
this is a result of many health risks being local in character. For example, in response to the 
threat of cholera, New York City created a Board of Health with police powers in 1866.115 Aided 
by emerging germ theory (thanks to John Snow's research into the 1854 cholera outbreak in 
London), the city was able to avoid the disastrous death tolls of the previous outbreaks in 1832 
and 1849.  
This illustrates not only how, in general, responses to a medical crisis were local in 
origin, but also shows the one most important features that made government intervention 
acceptable: transmittable disease. Transmittable diseases posed a public threat, and that threat 
required government action, after Robert Koch’s discovery of the tuberculosis bacteria, 
Mycobacterium tuberculosis, and the adoption of his theories, what was once considered 
consumption became the contagious disease tuberculosis.116 This confirmation of 
communicability encouraged city governments to campaign against the disease through 
education and the policing of public life.117  
The question of public or private risk is necessary to understand in the context of 
government intervention into medical issues. The government found it easier to justify an 
intervention when there was a danger to the health and safety of the public. Concern over the 
many dangers involved in riding on the railroad forced the enactment of regulations in the mid-
nineteenth century to provide for the safety of passengers. These safety regulations also 
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unintentionally improved the safety of railway workers.118 As Arwen Mohun notes in Risk, one 
of the biggest questions facing officials was “What kind of risks threatened the common good 
and were, therefore, an appropriate target for collective [government] action, and which were a 
private matter?”119 
Another factor influencing government medical intervention was the nature of that 
medical risk. Dangers to one’s health came in two forms: injury and disease. For the purpose of 
this thesis, injury will be defined as any damage caused to the body by a physical force that does 
not result in a substantial negative biological change to the body. For disease, this thesis will use 
the definition put forth by Charles Rosenberg in Framing Disease: the biological manifestation 
of medical knowledge as informed by social norms. Disease is a manifestation of social 
abnormality categorized by medical science. One of the most famous examples of this is 
homosexuality which was categorized as a disease because it deviated from the social norm120 
This categorization is possible thanks to the cultural authority afforded to the medical 
professions in the late nineteenth century; this authority means medicine could construct “reality 
through definitions of facts and value.”121 Of the two, injuries are more common and acceptable. 
To suffer an injury is normal, dependent upon the context wherein the injury is received; it is 
normal for a chef to be burned and cut, but such injuries do not usually occur in an office. Injury 
on a factory floor or skipjack, then, was normalized. 
It is the lack of a normalizing context that allows a culture of fear to develop around 
diseases. All diseases modify the “emotional and intellectual climate” of the societies which they 
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infect, and those which infect in waves of death engender strong emotional reactions, which in 
turn cause intellectual, social, and physical reactions.122 Therefore, industries have long fought 
against classifying occupational health problems as diseases, for it changes the ontology of the 
problem that alters the discourse by making it a physical threat to one’s health.123 For example, 
mining interests fought against the labeling of black lung as a disease—with some going so far as 
to suggest it was a prophylactic for tuberculosis.124 In the twentieth century, manufacturers 
obscured the connection between uranium exposure and cancer and challenged defining lead 
poisoning as a legitimate illness, because such changes would alter the dynamic of the problem 
by shifting the causal blame from the employee to the employer.125   
Disease and especially transmittable disease is a real, though at times exaggerated, threat 
to the public’s health. Cholera, tuberculosis, malaria, yellow fever, or, to draw on a more 
contemporary example, Ebola, all capture the public’s attention because they are scary and force 
a government to respond because they are dangerous. Maryland’s Board of Health chose to focus 
on combating diseases that threatened the general public over those which tended to infect a 
specific demographic. For the oyster dredger, this meant that the State Board of Health ignored 
their plight to focus on the “general care of the sanitary interest of the people.”126 Instead of 
regulating the working conditions on skipjacks, the state focused on collecting vital statistics, 
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regulating the practice of medicine, and managing Maryland’s water to prevent the spread of 
infectious diseases. 
 
Concerns of Water 
 One of the areas boards of health most focused on was water management. Improper 
management of water resources can lead to drastic negative health consequences. Beyond being 
an “immense protein factory,” the Chesapeake was also a great sewer and waste treatment 
plant.127 Much of Maryland’s refuse was dumped directly into the Bay and its tributaries. This 
method of waste disposal, called dilution, relied on the Bay’s vast size to dilute contaminants to 
where their presence did not pose a health threat and then over time natural processes would 
break down or remove microbes.128 This was the method proposed by the City of Baltimore for 
its new sewage system, but was blocked due to the danger such a system would pose to the 
oyster population.129 
 Even before John Snow’s study in 1854, people knew that water management was a way 
to mitigate the spread of disease.130 Therefore, to maintain public sanitation, one of the Board of 
Health’s priorities was the management of potable water and the improvement of sewage 
disposals.  Access to clean water and the removal of sewage was of particular concern to the City 
of Baltimore. In its 1884 Annual Report, the City’s Board of Health highlighted the dangers of 
an inadequate sewage system and its contamination of drinking water. “It is, therefore, simply 
madness to continue to use such an obviously dangerous source of cholera contagion” (in 
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Baltimore privies were placed near public water pumps without a cordon sanitaire).131 In 1885 
the City’s Board of Health repeated its call for the improvement of the city’s sewage system, 
listing the three leading causes of death for the municipality as old age, consumption, and 
cholera.132 In its 1888 report, the City’s Board declared that thanks to the Plumbing Ordinance of 
1884, which required inspection of water systems by sanitary officers, the reduction in deaths for 
the city were “very remarkable.”133 The State Board of Health was less impressed, noting that 
“had sewage works of any comprehensive plan been executed in Baltimore ten years ago, the 
city’s death rate would probably stand at 12 in 1000,” instead of 25 in 1000.134 
 There was also great concern over how wastewater, anthropogenic or otherwise in origin, 
could pollute the Bay. More alarmingly, this pollution could contaminate the state’s oyster beds. 
Since the oyster industry was fundamental to the state’s economy, and any contamination of 
Maryland’s main export would be devastating. As early as 1886, state authorities were cognizant 
of the danger water pollution posed to the oyster population and economic health of Maryland. 
“The effect that the emptying of such an enormous volume of human excrement [from 
Baltimore] into the Bay would have upon the fish and oyster—this is also a matter of serious 
contemplation.”135 In 1924, the mere suggestion that oysters from the Chesapeake could contain 
typhoid resulted in a cessation of harvesting until the completion of an investigation by the State 
                                                 
131 Annual Report of the Health Department of the City of Baltimore, to the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 
for the Fiscal Year Ending in December 31, 1884. 1885, 711–12., Courtesy of the Maryland State Archives. 
132 Annual Report of the Health Department of the City of Baltimore, to the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 
for the Fiscal Year Ending in December 31, 1885. 1886, 359–67, Courtesy of the Maryland State Archives. 
133 Annual Report of the Health Department of the City of Baltimore, to the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 
for the Fiscal Year Ending in December 31, 1888. 1889, 302, Courtesy of the Maryland State Archives; Carroll Fox, 
“Public Health Administration in Baltimore: A Study of the Organization and Administration of the City Health 
Department,” Public Health Reports (1896-1970) 29, no. 24 (1914): 1546.—The actual reduction was a twenty 
percent decrease from 28 (1836-1883) to 22 (1884-1888) percent of deaths being caused by zymotic diseases. The 
ordinance was enacted in 1884. 
134 Ninth Biennial Report of the State Board of Health of Maryland for the Two Years Ending December 31st, 1891. 
(C. H. Baughman & Co, State Printers, Annapolis., 1892), 16 and 327, Courtesy of the Maryland State Archives. 
135 Sixth Biennial Report of the State Board of Health of Maryland, January 1886. (Printed by George T. Melvin, 
1886), 30, Courtesy of the Maryland State Archives. 
41 
 
Board of Health. By the time that the inquiry was over, the season had ended, and the harvest for 
the year—and associated income—was significantly lower than previous years.136 
The concern of oyster contamination was the direct cause of Baltimore’s lackluster sewer 
system during the nineteenth century. Both the state and local Boards of Health called for the 
implementation of some sewage system in the city to move contaminated water away from the 
city and preserve clean water for Baltimoreans.137 As a result, the City’s Board suggested a 
system whereby the untreated refuse from the city would be pumped out into the Patapsco River. 
(fig. 10)The oyster industry vigorously opposed this proposal because of concerns that the 
sewage would contaminate the oyster beds around the Patapsco River. Only when the city agreed 
to construct the most advanced wastewater treatment facility in the country did the oyster 
interests greenlight Baltimore’s sewage system.138 Instead of using a dilution method, the city 
opted for a treatment system that would protect the oyster stocks from possible contamination. 
Consequently, in 1912 Baltimore was the first major city in the country to have a wastewater 
treatment plant.139  
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Figure 10: A map of the oyster beds near the Patapsco River. “Maryland’s Historic Oyster Bottom: A Geographic Representation of the 
Traditional Named Oyster Bars.” Maryland Department of Natural Resources Fisheries Service Cooperative Oxford Laboratory Mapping and 
Analysis Project. October 1997.  
 Concern for the danger presented by waterborne diseases such as cholera convinced 
health officials of the need to properly manage public water sources. However, these concerns 
ran up against one of the state’s most important industries, economically and politically. 
Protection of the oyster tempered concern for human health. In fact, the dumping of effluence 
into the Bay was used as a scapegoat for the depletion of oyster stocks, deflecting suspicion from 
poor resource management and over-harvesting.140  
The Maryland oyster industry was not, however, all-powerful, as it could not stop the 
state from regulating the practice of dredging.141  Even that regulation, though, was about the 
preservation of the oyster beds to placate the politically significant tongers of the tidewater 
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counties, and the enforcement of these regulations was limited. 142 Regulations by the General 
Assembly sought to preserve the health and safety (through limits on sewage and extraction) of 
oysters under the guise of protecting labor from elite economic interest. This is not to suggest 
that the elevation of the bivalve over the bipedal was a net-negative for public health, but that it 
altered the concepts of water control. This alteration at times prevented effective water controls 
from being implemented, but also resulted in Baltimore City having one of the most advanced 
water treatment plants in the country.143  
 
Role of the State Board of Health of Maryland 
 The State Board of Health of Maryland recommended that Baltimore City construct a 
sewage system because it fell within its modus operandi of preventing the spread of infectious 
diseases. To understand why the State Board of Health was disinclined to provide medical care 
for oystermen we need to understand how the Board operated within the state of Maryland. The 
Board was primarily concerned with providing for general sanitation of the state, creating and 
enforcing professional standards, and the collection of vital statistics. Formed in 1874 by the 
General Assembly, the Board of Health initially lacked any enforcement or regulatory powers; 
this was common for many state health agencies.144 The Board acted as an advisory body to the 
General Assembly and the governor, and consisted of six to ten members, most of whom were 
doctors (along with the Attorney General, who was an ex officio member). As described by 
Mohun in Risk, new regulatory agencies needed first to gather data before having the authority to 
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make recommendations to state legislatures.145 However, without any local health boards (except 
Baltimore City) there was little the Board could do in the enforcement of health laws or the 
regulation of sanitation. In 1886, the Board had its powers expanded, allowing it to enforce some 
regulations and create local boards of health. However, the local government would appoint the 
board members. 
In the State Board of Health’s Eighth Report (1890) the Board noted, “This act [the 1886 
law] has not been carried out generally” and “[u]nder the present circumstances, many counties 
are practically without any local sanitary supervision whatever.” 146 Later in the century, after the 
establishment of local health boards, there was still great difficulty getting consistent 
enforcement of health regulations. Even when health boards were set up in the 23 counties and 
Baltimore City, this did not correlate to effective administrative coordination. For example, the 
1907 Maryland Board of Health report included a section for reports from local boards, and 
several counties failed to submit a report.147 
 While the administrative misalignment between state and county-level institutions caused 
some problems for collecting vital statistics and enforcement of health regulations, the Board of 
Health’s self-conceived mission is what established their regulatory relationship with the state’s 
populous. Largely, the Board of Health was concerned with defending the public against 
transmittable diseases.  At its inception in 1874, the Board focused on establishing a knowledge 
base to provide for the common interest. The first report produced by the board, two years after 
its creation, noted:  
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1) That many common diseases are preventable, and; 
2) They are preventable in the sense of being dependent on 
 the removal of conditions which operate on the people as a whole.148 
 
  
In the late nineteenth century, the idea that a disease was contagious was not an 
established scientific fact.149 John Snow had found a strong correlative connection between 
cholera and contaminated drinking water in his investigation of London in 1854; however, 
transmittable diseases were considered the exception, not the rule.150 The gradual acceptance of 
germ theory through the late nineteenth century showed to health officials that the causes of 
disease were anthropogenic in origin.151 This meant that it was now possible to control the 
spread of a disease. This control came in two forms: control of the environment and control of 
human behavior. In The Gospel of Germs, Nancy Tomes explains that germ theory did not 
change the loci of blame for illness, which remained focused on actions of the individual.152 
Before germ theory, it was believed that a person’s life choices were the cause of his/her illness 
in a moral sense. Consumption, for example, was thought to be caused by alcoholism and 
prostitution.153 After germ theory, an individual’s life choices were the cause of his/her illness in 
a literal sense. These life choices centered on ideas of cleanliness as correlated with an 
individual’s moral character.154 Controlling an individual’s behavior was then necessary for 
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controlling the spread of disease, and took precedence over environmental control. The power 
for that behavior control came from the new authority given to doctors and health officials 
thanks to scientific advances and professionalization.155  During the second half of the nineteenth 
century, the position of the physician in American society was in flux. The profession itself 
became redefined with a new focus on education grounded in the unbiased sciences. Medical 
societies (most notably the American Medical Association) enforced professional standards to 
help ensure the social authority of the doctor. These reforms included the development of more 
rigorous educational apparatuses in the 1870s. By the end of the nineteenth century, the reforms 
had resulted in a system of schooling which would be recognized today. This move toward 
institutionalization can be found in other professions and is emblematic of the growing 
professionalism advocated by progressive reformers.156  
This growing progressive sentiment—built upon a genuine concern for the protection of 
human life along with a desire to expand the authority of doctors—is reflected in the Board of 
Health’s concern with the “[d]epredations of human life by ‘quacks’ and imposters.”157 The 
Board noted that having unlicensed individuals practicing medicine is a threat to public health, 
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and “the most incompetent and illiterate individual in the state . . . can call himself a doctor.” 158 
The Board goes on to ask for the General Assembly to pass legislation that would require any 
person wishing to work as a physician in the state of Maryland to have “received the degree of 
doctor in medicine from some institution empowered by law to grant the degree.”159 It would 
then remain in the power of the Board to verify these degrees. A draft bill was submitted to the 
General Assembly by the State Sanitary Conference in November of 1887 and signed into law 
the next year.160 
Beyond maintaining professional hegemony, the Board’s primary concern was to work 
toward the sanitary welfare of the state. One of the main concerns of the Board was the 
collection of health statistics, and the synthesis of these statistics allowed the Board to develop 
policies to counteract discovered problems. Regarding public health, this involved the collection 
of information on births, deaths, and morbidity. In the Board’s seventh report, Secretary C. W. 
Chancellor noted that to provide care for the health of the state there must be “collections of the 
most complete information available.”161 He then went on to criticize: “Our state has hitherto 
paid little attention to the important subject of vital statistics, but has contended itself with a 
knowledge of the fact that its people live and pay taxes, and then die, it knows not how or 
when.”162 
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The collection of this data focused on diseases, including consumption/tuberculosis, 
malaria, cholera, and yellow fever.163 These diseases presented a danger to the public at large 
and, in particular, a threat to crowded urban landscapes such as Baltimore City.  
 The Board of Health considered its primary directive to provide for the sanitation of the 
state’s population. This view was in line with a general transformation of what the government 
could and should do for its citizenry around this time. The late nineteenth  century was a period 
of bureaucratic fluctuation, where the idea that the government had the power and duty to intrude 
into the lives of the citizenry in the name of public health started to take hold, though this often 
brought a clash between the notions of the public good and “individual liberty.”164 There are 
examples of this in city health departments’ attempts to combat tuberculosis; these included 
efforts to regulate the movements of tubercular individuals, as well as educational campaigns and 
sanitary investigations.165 This change also occurred at a time when the evolution of hospitals 
was shifting away from viewing hospitals as charnel houses toward viewing them as scientific 
treatment centers. Spurred by advances in science and technology, medicine moved into the 
public realm with renewed confidence and made aggressive attempts to regulate public life 
through the application of science by unbiased professionals.  
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 These regulations of the public sphere were shepherded by the sanitarian movement, 
which was instrumental in the development of public health agencies in the U.S. Sanitary 
sciences and professionals “stressed the ubiquity of airborne infection and the disease-causing 
properties of human waste and organic decay.”166 Of particular concern for sanitarians was the 
management of municipal water and waste.167 This is exemplified by the Board of Health for the 
City of Baltimore’s perpetual concern with the management of potable water. 
 There was, however, some concern over government intrusion into the medical 
profession, which many doctors saw as a threat to their independence and authority.168 In the 
case of tuberculosis, many doctors refused to register any diagnosed cases with local authorities, 
considering it to be a violation of the patient’s rights and an attack upon the physician’s 
professional independence.169 Maryland’s Board of Health also wrestled with these issues. In its 
1884 report, the Board discusses “[t]he conflict of state power and individual rights in sanitary 
matters.” That paper’s author, Dr. Richard Gundry, considered how sanitary enforcement 
agencies must walk a tight line between infringing upon individual rights and failing to provide 
for the general sanitation of the populous. Particularly, he felt that it was important for regulatory 
agencies to ensure that they have public support for their actions:  
Better by far, that the law be deficient in some detail, with an enlightened and 
aroused public opinion upon the subject, than the most perfectly devised law with 
an apathetic or hostile sentiment in the community where it is to be enforced. 
There is in reality no law so inefficient as that which is not fully supported by 
public opinion. If enforced it is regarded as tyrannical.170 
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Views of the Oyster Dredgers 
 
The State Board of Health considered it its duty to provide for the general public, 
navigating the line between encroachment into private affairs and an abridgment of public trust. 
This is not to suggest that the Board failed to recognize that selected occupational demographics 
faced specific risks. The Board was well aware of the problems facing many Maryland workers. 
In 1888 it published, as part of its Biennial Report, an examination of the “Sickness Among the 
Laboring Class.” First, and ironically, considering the Board’s previous calls for comprehensive 
data collection, it noted that the State lacked any data on the subject. The Board suggested that 
once there is an accurate census of sicknesses among laborers the legislature could take proper 
action.  
Despite the dearth of data, the Board still attempted to comment on the state of illness 
among laborers. Though thoroughly ensconced in the Doctrine of Assumed Risk, the Board also 
conceded that perhaps there were some “methods of work which admit of change.”171 The Board 
considered most health issues faced by the workers to be of their own doing, suggesting that 
these workers would be more likely to change their habits when faced with hard data than the 
“most inflammatory preaching.”172  
Education to modify behaviors was a common technique used by public health officials 
in the nineteenth century. For example, city employees would hand out pamphlets telling people 
how to avoid tuberculosis and often the solution was to avoid alcohol.173As noted previously, 
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immoral behavior correlated to illness. This was also true in an industrial setting. Many 
sanitarians thought smoking and drinking caused lung disease among industrial workers because 
such activities were immoral.174 In the eyes of many officials, poor moral judgment caused most 
industrial accidents. Before and after Germ Theory’s acceptance, the general assumption was 
that the working poor were responsible for their health problems. Vices are a great scapegoat for 
disease, and the Board of Health was not opposed to naming them as the instigators of poor 
health among the workers.175 In a paper entitled “Mortality among Farmers, Laborers, and 
Mechanics,” the Board expressed concern for the health of these workers, noting that about one-
quarter of the state was employed in these trades (which would include oystermen). Improving 
their health meant improving their habits so that they would have “less temptation than before to 
some forms of excesses injurious to health.”176  
Concern for the dangers of industrial disease and hazards by the Board correlated with 
concerns for the economic wellbeing of the state and were in line with the ideas of many 
sanitarians of the late nineteenth century. John Duffy shows in The Sanitarians that many public 
health officials equated good health with economic prosperity.177 As the Board itself noted: “A 
high death rate . . . implies not only a waste of life, but a concurrent waste of time and 
energy.”178 Ensuring a healthy populous had economic implications because a healthy populous 
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is a productive one.179 This argument provided the state with an economic incentive to protect 
worker’s health; preservation of health undoubtedly was also about preserving Maryland’s 
industrial and agricultural productivity.180  This is not to imply that the Board was composed of 
Gilded Age taskmasters more concerned with profit than human dignity, but that there was a 
parallel consideration to be taken when providing for sanitary regulation and enforcement. One 
should not take the Board highlighting that improvements in health will improve the productivity 
of the state as a callous write-off of working class laborers, but as a tactical move to garner more 
support for health regulations. The Board itself lacked legislative powers; it only had the power 
to report and make suggestions to the General Assembly. For the Board to bring what it saw as 
proper regulations into force it had to convince the legislature that these proposed laws would be 
beneficial to the whole state by protecting the health of its citizens without retarding its 
economic output.  
The Board focused on threats to the entire public and at rare times focused on selected 
groups such as laborers. In only a single instance between 1874 to 1900 did the Board directly 
address the hygienic conditions of oyster dredgers. In its 1878 biennial report, as part of a wider 
discussion on ventilation, the board called for the hulls of skipjacks to be ventilated. 181  As the 
Board noted, at that time almost 6,000 oystermen were working the Bay: “The oyster-trade is 
amongst the largest in this State, and hence, numerically and financially considered, the sailors 
of the State demand attention of our statesmen.”182  
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However, like with other reports on the workers of the state, the Board was quick to 
asterisk their report with a note about the disposition of oyster dredgers: “Mentally they are 
ignorant, superstitious, and dull.”183 The industrial dredger was nothing more than a dullard, 
incapable of the higher levels of thought necessary to understand why he was ill. This was one of 
the greatest paradoxes facing the industrial health field. The laborer was largely ignorant of how 
to care for his sanitation, and that ignorance prevented him from rising to a better state of health. 
Improvements in health had to be accomplished through establishing control, either of the 
environment or body.184 The trend had been to control the body, as that would impose fewer 
restrictions upon business.185  
While the state was perfectly willing to regulate the common environment of the Bay, the 
private environment of the skipjack was considered off limits.186 The Board, it seems, like many 
health agencies, had restricted access to areas of economic production in part because they did 
not want to interfere with productivity, but also because of the political power of the captains of 
these economic vessels.187  
Another reason why the Maryland Board of Health seemed to have little interest in 
intervening on behalf of laborers, and specifically oyster dredgers, was that such intervention 
would also cross regulatory jurisdictions. Both The Oyster Commission and the Bureau of 
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Industrial Statistics and Information had oversight authority of the oyster industry; this raises a 
question as to whose responsibility the welfare of that laboring class fell. The Board of Health, as 
we have seen, was leery of encroaching into the domain of private individuals, and the domain of 
economic production areas: skipjacks. There was more cause for the Bureau of Industrial 
Statistics to engage with these industrial units than the Board of Health. Much like the Board of 
Health, though, the Bureau was more interested in the collection of data than intervening into the 
affairs of industry and labor. Such interventions, limited as they were, were focused on keeping 
the peace in Maryland. “It has been the aim of the Bureau to encourage such relations, and to do 
no act which could jeopardize the friendly conditions which have been happily maintained 
between labor and capital in Maryland.”188 
The Oyster Commission had the most oversight of the oyster industry. It, however, was 
more concerned with the maintenance of the oyster resources in Maryland. This predilection to 
prioritize bivalves over people was practically state dogma. Concerns for the oyster cascaded 
through the government, filtering through the different branches and levels to create a policy that 
prioritized the transitory economic solvency of the oyster stocks over long-term management of 
the industry, including care for its laborers.189 
When discussing the welfare of oystermen, the language of the Commission or Bureau 
placed the preponderance of blame for poor health on the worker. This outlook was in line with 
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the views of many medical professionals during the nineteenth century.190 Connected to this was 
the racial makeup of the dredging workforce, comprised predominantly of immigrants—in fact, 
it may be surprising to learn that in 1894 fewer than 12 percent of the dredgers were native 
Marylanders. The majority of dredgers were illiterate as well.191 Conversely, almost every 
captain was a Marylander, because all skipjacks had to be owned by a state citizen.192 The 
captains were all, apparently, “citizens of the state” and had” a social standing in their local 
community.” That is to say, they are all native Americans and native Marylanders. Seemingly at 
odds with secondary literature, and reports from The Sun and the Marine Hospital Service, the 
Bureau of Industrial Statistics held skipjack captains in high regard.  
Away from the Chesapeake the Maryland dredge captain is regarded as a reckless 
and lawless class of man; this does these men a great injustice; they are peacefully 
disposed as the gentility of Mankind, engaged in a lawful and useful occupation. 
But, it is not surprising that out of 800 dredging captains there should be a few 
reckless and unprincipled persons.193 
 
 
This is clearly an exaggeration of the situation on the Chesapeake. That there were honest 
and dishonest captains is not in dispute, merely the ratio. There is little doubt that the political 
power of the skipjack captain played a role in these generous descriptions; these were not simply 
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captains of vessels, but also of industry, a gentry of the Bay with deep political connections to 
local elites.194 It is important to remember that power in Maryland was federal in style; that is to 
say, the counties held a lot of administrative and judicial control.195 This localized control 
granted skipjack captains the influence of small-scale industrialist. 
The Bureau of Industrial Statistics seemed to internalize the view of industrial leaders as 
exemplars of human economic achievement, believing that through skill and wit these men 
achieved a greatness that the average worker lacked the merit to achieve. Distinctions of class 
and ethnic ability are clearly evident in the Bureau’s report: The captains “as most other 
employers of labor, are humane, and considerate of those in their service.”196 Those working for 
the captains, however, were “unaccustomed to discipline that the exercise of the authority 
necessary on board a vessel,” this “unavoidably produces some unpleasantness between captain 
and men.”197 Ergo, any resulting mistreatment is just a result of the nature of the working 
conditions and the seedy character of the workforce. 
Injury, then, was a product of the hand's inability to care for his safety. This was keeping 
with Gilded Age approaches to industrial safety, where upon entering employment the laborer 
assumed the risks of the industrial space. Dredging was considered an industrial form of work; 
hands working on a skipjack operated within an industrialized setting and so were considered as 
such by the state of Maryland. This is why the Bureau of Industrial Statistics and Board of 
Health focused so heavily on the morality of the dredger: because in Gilded Age America that 
was considered the cause of ill health among the urban working class.198 These ideas were 
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predominant in public health officials of the time. Before germ theory, disease was “equated with 
sin.”199 Though, with the advent of germ theory many sanitary scientists were quick to show that 
this only “verified the ‘great truths’ of sanitary science.”200 The vector of disease shifted from 
the divine to the microscopic, but the underlining causes stayed the same. In such an 
understanding, disease was caused by human action, action that could be controlled, so long as it 
did not interfere with an economic enterprise.201 
 Skipjacks, however, were also exposed to the elements. In the nineteenth century 
individuals could not be held responsible for injuries caused by environmental forces. As Mohun 
states in Risk: “The vagaries of weather were the most constant, most pervasive, and least 
susceptible to human manipulation.”202 This is why the reports from the Board of Health, Bureau 
of Industrial Statistics, and Oyster Commission largely ignore tongers, because they operated 
under a preindustrial economic system and did so in an uncontrollable environment; it was 
accepted that tongers would face health risks. Because however, tongers did not operate under an 
industrial employment system, but instead were owner and manager of their operations, the state 
did not need to denigrate their morality to rationalize the health risk they faced on the job.203 
Because dredgers worked in an industrial setting, the Board and Bureau had to use Gilded Age 
ideas to justify the health risks dredgers faced. Hands on dredging skipjacks were not injured 
because of their working conditions, but because captains were unable to afford to hire better 
workers, despite recognizing the “injury that employment of this class or labor is doing to the 
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reputation of their business—due to the slim profit margins of fishery economics.”204 This 
resulted in situations where captains, unable to attract a better class of worker had to “resort to 
methods that strongly resemble impressment and violence.”205 
Vestiges of preindustrial Jeffersonianism can be found in the Bureau’s view as well. One 
report notes that most of the dredgers from Baltimore were much better off on the Bay than in 
the urban environment of Baltimore City.206 This runs parallel to growing middle-class concerns 
about the damage urban industrial life was doing to society.207 Compounding this, dredging 
laborers did not operate within older traditions of engaging in a lifetime economic pursuit (as the 
tongers did), they were “in no sense Bay men.”208  
 
Conclusion  
 As was shown, there were several factors which prevented the state of Maryland from 
intervening in the dredging industry to improve the workplace health and safety of skipjacks. 
These factors were unique to Maryland in their details, but not unique in conception. Concerns 
about water quality as specifically related to the welfare of oysters over people shows that state 
officials prioritized the economic competitiveness of the state.209 Other states were dealing with 
these same issues but within a different context. It is important to remember that states are often 
in economic competition with one another. Though Maryland was the nation’s largest oyster 
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producer, Virginia also harvested oysters.210 Competition between the two states became so 
fierce that there was a quasi-war over rights to the Tangier Sound.211 Similar problems existed in 
other industries. Coal- producing states were often reluctant to enforce safety rules because they 
feared that mining corporations would move their operations to states with fewer regulations.212 
 Worrying about damaging an important source of wealth through excessive regulation is 
not an entirely false line of reasoning. The oyster industry was exceedingly important to the 
state’s economic fortunes.213 Therefore, it is not unreasonable for the Oyster Commission and 
Bureau of Industrial Statistics to have been more concerned with ensuring continued profitability 
of the oyster over the health of the oyster harvester. 
The Commission wanted to improve the productivity of oyster grounds through better 
scientific management and the privatization of oyster beds.214 The oyster question (whether 
oyster beds should be privatized or left as a common resource) dominated much of the public’s 
attention, and one is more likely to find a discussion of access rights and licensing problems in 
local newspapers than concerns over the treatment of dredgers.215 In its 1884 report, the Oyster 
Commission called for the implementation of private oyster farming, which they claimed could 
add sixty million dollars to the state’s economy.216 
Furthermore, reform of the industry could potentially expand employment in Maryland: 
“[The current commons system] has given employment to about fifty thousand of our people for 
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part of the year, while our grounds should give profitable employment to five hundred thousand 
people for the whole year.”217 An exaggeration no doubt, but if improving the oyster industry 
could result in even a slight fraction of that estimate—or simply provide full-time employment to 
the fifty thousand workers—the net economic benefit to the state would have been quite 
significant. With millions of dollars and the gainful employment of tens of thousands at stake, it 
is not difficult to see why regulatory agencies were more concerned with the management of the 
oyster extraction system as a whole rather than a specific aspect of that system’s working 
conditions.218 This privatization plan did not get implemented due to the resistance of the 
politically connected oyster industry, which saw the project to privatize the Chesapeake Bay as 
an attack on its economic freedom.219  
On the few occasions the Board of Health and Bureau of Industrial Statistics considered 
the health of laborers, it did so using the attitudes of experts at that time. Injury was not the result 
of working conditions, but the actions of laborers. If the working condition was at fault, it was a 
result of the natural, not human, environment, and so well beyond human control.220 In such a 
condition, where the unpredictable nature of the Chesapeake was understood to be the source of 
most danger, it then fell to the dredging hand to mitigate the potential for injury; the Board of 
Health noted that laborers would “sustain unnecessary injury to their health from want of pre-
caution.”221  In cases of industrial disease, the cause was due to an individual’s personal life 
choices.222  
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The Board of Health was more concerned with the collection of vital statistics and the 
prevention of disease outbreaks in the state than the dangerous environment of the skipjack. With 
the growth of urban centers (by 1920 sixty percent of the state lived in towns with a population 
of at least 2,500), increased population density in areas of industrial production, and expanded 
international trade, the potential for severe outbreaks was an ever-present threat which occupied 
most public health officials’ time and energy.223 Just as Maryland’s Bureau of Industrial 
Statistics decided to “do no act which could jeopardize the friendly conditions which have been 
happily maintained between labor and capital,” other agencies avoided “the appearance of 
collecting data just to prove the labor movement’s claims.”224 This concern with collecting data 
without rocking the boat was fairly common in the U.S.  Many agencies often were more 
concerned with establishing their authority through using “cold hard number [to] provide 
seemingly objective proof” than engaging in any intervention.225 
 The State Board of Health for Maryland also sought to establish its authority and control 
over medicine in Maryland, in a mirror image of what was happening at the federal level and 
within other states.226 Once the medical profession was made professional, government 
physicians could engage in public hygiene reform and regulation thanks to their cultural 
authority.227 In doing so, concerns over individual rights versus collective safety came to the 
fore. The State Board of Health for Maryland took the view consistent with its Gilded Age 
contemporaries, that individualism, as expressed through laissez-faire capitalist ideals, limited 
the actions of the government. As with other agencies and industrial hygienist, even into the 
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twentieth century, this economic and social dogma limited how public health officials could 
intervene. Many inspectors found that they lacked police powers, being only allowed onto 
factory floors with the owner’s permission. 
As with other government agencies, Maryland’s Board of Health wrestled with what 
exactly its role was and how intrusive it could be in caring for the general welfare of the state’s 
health. The Board, under longtime Secretary C.W. Chancellor, erred on the side of non-
intervention that typified many—though not all—regulatory boards.228 Direct intervention into 
private industry was still a new and contested idea in late nineteenth century America. When 
questioned about the poor sanitary conditions on skipjacks by The Baltimore Sun, Chancellor 
commented that the Board only had the power to make suggestions on sanitary matters.229 Only 
the General Assembly could take action, and oyster interests dominated the legislature.230 In 
Maryland, then, the standard operating procedure for the Board of Health and other regulatory 
agencies was limited intervention and an aversion to aggressive bureaucratic activism. Concerns 
about health focused on improving sanitation and public works. Intervention into private affairs 
or provisions for selected care was not up for consideration.  
The constructed definitions of the Chesapeake Bay and the nature of dredging created the 
terrain of interaction that the state government had with the oyster industry. Determinations 
about dredgers were a result of their classification as industrial wage laborers and residents of 
urban areas, and were negatively juxtaposed with the independent, native,  and rural boat captain 
and tonger. 231   This determination also meant that regulatory agencies treated the dredging fleet 
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of the Chesapeake as an industrialized production unit, which encouraged non-intervention 
policies. 
Compounded with this was the State Board of Health for Maryland’s reflective ontology. 
Their focus on public welfare through water management and vital statistic collection 
necessitated that they ignore specific occupational groups. Their concern with rights 
infringement further reduced their schema of hygiene enforcement. The government of Maryland 
was disinclined to aggressively enforce health and safety standards on its oyster fleet, just as 
other state governments shied away from doing so to factories and mines. The Board of Health 
also was unable to provide direct medical relief because its role was to act “as an advisory board 
of the State in all hygienic and medical matters.”232 The Board operated within a strict 
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Chapter 3: The Marine Hospital Service on the Bay 
 
 This chapter will explore the importance played by a newly professionalized bureaucracy 
in developing interventionist federal policy in the late nineteenth century. The Marine Hospital 
Service (MHS) was created to be an intrusive agency. The MHS also considered its duty to 
intervene and provide medical care, and so advocated for expansions to fill the health gaps it 
perceived. Much as the Maryland Board of Health saw its role as providing for the public good 
and so limited its intervention into private affairs, the Marine Hospital Service saw its role as 
providing for the welfare of seamen and focused its efforts on expanding or improving the 
medical relief it provided.  
 The federal government was largely uninvolved in medical relief or safety regulation in 
the nineteenth century.233 The few instances of federal action or intervention into health were 
limited in the scope of the people it served. Such examples of federally administered health care 
include the Bureau of Indian Affairs medical facilities on reservations in 1849 and the 
Freedman’s Hospitals established after the Civil War.234  One anomaly is the first federal agency 
to provide medical care, or in this case relief: the Marine Hospital Service. It was created by 
Congress in 1798 “to provide the temporary relief and maintenance of sick or disabled 
seamen.”235 The MHS saw the scope of its service expand, to the point where in 1889 it sent a 
decommissioned revenue cutter to a small, and for most people unknown, place called Solomons 
Island, Maryland to provide relief for oyster dredgers.236 
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 That MHS provided health services to Maryland oystermen was the result of two factors. 
First, the MHS had already seen its scope of service expand several times throughout the past 
century, the step of providing care to oystermen was relatively small within the service’s overall 
expansion—this was not the only facility created to treat watermen in the United States. Second, 
in the late nineteenth century, and especially the 1870s, the federal government was transitioning 
to a fully professional civil service, with civil service protections from partisan influences in 
place by 1877.237 The early professionalization granted the MHS a degree of control over its 
affairs allowing it to make some—not all, but some—decisions quarantined from the interference 
of politicians. By the 1870s, the professionalized MHS was able to leverage its cultural authority 
to control its expansion to areas where medical care was needed, not where it was politically 
useful. While significant expansion—and associated expenditures—had to be initiated through 
acts of Congress, these more limited expansions needed no legislative oversight. The MHS’s 
expansion into the Chesapeake Bay was not a large expansion of bureaucratic power. As a Third 
Class Relief Station, the Solomons Island Relief Station was the smallest station in the MHS, 
staffed by only a single MHS physician (an acting assistant surgeon), the establishment of such 
stations was a matter for professional bureaucrats, not politicians, to approve.238 What makes the 
creation of this, and other Third Class Relief Stations, unique is that they were done without any 
political input. 239    
 Most investigations of the expansion of federal government and policy after the Civil 
War emphasize the role of Congress and the president, that is to say they emphasize politicians. 
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In such examinations it was Congress which authorized or the president that pushed for the 
federal government to create or expand agencies and policies. Theodor Sky’s examination of the 
expansion of federal power in To Provide for the General Welfare highlights the importance of 
Congress and politics in pushing—and limiting—federal intrusion.240 In Safety First, Mark 
Aldrich also places legislation on a historical pedestal, as does Richard Bensel in Yankee 
Leviathan.241 For Aldrich, failures in the courts, and muckraking of workplace tragedies proved 
to be the impetuses for Congressional action. Bensel argues that the momentum for federal 
expansion came from the Civil War and Reconstruction. John Witt’s Accidental Republic is a 
legal history that highlights the evolution of tort law in encouraging corporations to start offering 
workman’s compensation.242 Witt also examines the growth of co-operative social insurance 
programs as a way to fill the gap left by government non-intervention policies. Such a non-
intervention policy was informed by Gilded Age ideals of free labor.243 Other authors have 
focused on non-governmental forces. Christopher Sellers’s Hazards of the Job looks at how 
labor movements and other social actors sought to enforce health regulations, though, his work is 
also more focused on the growth of environmental health. Indeed, few historians focus on the 
importance of the federal bureaucracy in pushing for expansions of federal policy.244 
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The Marine Hospital Service 
The MHS was not the first instance of government-funded medical care for sailors. After 
its victory over the Spanish Armada in 1588, the British government established a hospital in 
Greenwich to care for naval veterans. In 1696, the “Act for Encouragement and Increase of 
Seamen” expanded the clientele of the Greenwich Hospital to any member of the Royal Navy, or 
the merchant fleet, that “because of age, wounds, or other accidents became disabled for further 
sea duty.”245 In 1729, the colonial governments in America were directed to start collecting a tax 
on seamen to help fund the hospital, at 6 pennies a sailor.246 The idea of government-
administered medical relief is not as new or as surprising as many contemporary politicians 
claim. Much of the debate in Congress in 1798 centered on the location of the hospitals, with 
congressmen seeking to serve their regional interest, rather than on whether it was the 
government’s job to provide this care.247   
Political meddling had been particularly problematic in the MHS. The MHS was part of 
the Treasury Department, and for administrative convenience, each site was under the direction 
of the local Collector of Customs—who collected the maintenance tax. The Collector—a 
political appointee—had carte blanche over who was appointed to provide the medical care, 
leading the Service to become spoiled by the politics of corruption. Due to this mismanagement, 
the MHS was chronically underfunded; Congress had to establish a general fund after just four 
years of operation and after 1840 annual appropriations became the rule.248 In 1884, a tonnage 
tax  replaced the per-head tax, and in 1905 annual appropriations replaced the tonnage tax.249  
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It is important to highlight the 1884 tonnage tax. Up until 1884 a portion of the MHS 
funding came from a direct tax on sailors, fixed at forty cents per month at sea in 1870, this 
meant that sailors were paying directly into a medical relief fund.250 After 1884, however, the 
monthly tax was eliminated, and the U.S. government began to directly fund the MHS, through a 
tonnage tax on all vessels entering the U.S: 
Sections forty-five hundred and eighty-five, forty-five hundred and eighty-six, 
and forty-five hundred and eighty-seven of the Revised Statutes, and all other acts 
and parts of acts providing for the assessment and collection of a hospital tax for 
seamen, are hereby repealed, and the expense of maintaining the Marine Hospital 
Service shall hereafter be borne by the United States out of the receipts for duties 
on tonnage provided for by this act; and so much thereof as may be necessary, is 
hereby appropriated for that purpose.251 
 
Thus, by the time the MHS Relief Station in Solomons Island was established (and the 
same year a construction on a permanent MHS hospital in Baltimore City began) seamen were 
no longer paying directly into a relief fund to receive medical aid. That ship captains took the 
associated tax out of a seaman’s pay—and therefore indirectly pay for medical relief—is not in 
dispute, but none-the-less the official source of funding for the MHS was the federal treasury. 
Importantly to the Chesapeake Bay is that skipjacks paid no tonnage tax. Oyster dredgers, then, 
were receiving tax-funded government-run medical relief! 
 By 1870, it was clear that the service needed serious reform. The Tammany-style wards 
throughout the hospitals were crippling the system, both financially and morally. In June 1870, 
Congress passed “An act to reorganize the Marine Hospital Service, and to provide for the relief 
of sick and disabled Seamen.”252 This change made the Service an independent agency within 
the Treasury Department, under the leadership of the Supervising Surgeon placing the MHS 
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under the administration of a medical professional instead of a political appointee.253 Each 
station mimicked the changes carried out at the top, with the Collector of Customs replaced by 
physicians as the stewards for the hospitals and relief stations (ranging in title from surgeon, 
assistant surgeon, to acting assistant surgeon depending on the station’s class). The “Officer in 
Command” had to be certified by a board of surgeons, in addition to passing a civil service test 
before he could take his post.254  The re-organization of the Service improved the quality of 
relief stations by making sure individuals in charge of the stations were “versed in sanitary 
science” and “familiar in the management of hospitals.”255 
 Just like the Maryland Board of Health, the MHS sought to solidify its professionalism 
through self- regulation. In 1873—one year before the Maryland Board of Health was 
established—the Marine Hospital Service produced a series of regulations to clarify provisions 
from the 1870 law. These regulations included periodic inspections of all facilities and required 
surgeons to pass an examination for all appointments or promotions. The examinations “were so 
rigid that only 40 percent of candidates qualified during the first ten years.”256 So important were 
these regulations that the MHS repeatedly called for Congress to codify them to ensure that the 
Service would be free of future political interference: 
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I have urged for the past six years that Congress make provisions for the 
appointment of medical officers . . . It is difficult to imagine that a man of 
experience would seriously urge the appointing power to cause the setting aside of 
regulations so obviously in the interest of humanity simply to obtain a place for a 
friend however needy, but experience has convinced me that nothing short of law 
will prevent these attempts with each recurring change of administration.257 
 
 
 This professionalization parallels the same trend occurring in American medicine. In 
1871 Harvard completely reorganized its medical school; laboratory work in “physiology, 
chemistry, and pathological anatomy” replaced lectures.258 In most states, medical licensing did 
not become the norm until the 1870s and 1880s; in Maryland, the Board of Health did not have 
the power to verify medical credentials until 1888.259 This reform of the MHS represents a shift 
in the administration of government agencies. In line with the wider medical community, the 
MHS reorganized itself under budding ideals of an unbiased meritocracy and did so before most 
other organizations.260 By the late nineteenth century, municipal and state government health 
authorities moved from operating under political patronage to professional practicality. In line 
with this bureaucratization, the MHS became more regimented and compartmentalized as part of 
a general trend toward professionalism in American medicine.261 This professionalization 
granted the MHS a new authority that allowed the Service to chart its own expansion. 
Where state-level boards of health in the late nineteenth century focused on their 
development, the MHS concentrated on improving and expanding its service.  Over the decades, 
the MHS saw the purview of its mission expand. Changes were slow before the 1870 
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reorganization. In 1802 non-Americans serving on American vessels were allowed to seek 
treatment at the MHS hospitals.262 By the mid-nineteenth century, the Service expanded its reach 
by building stations in internal ports, starting in 1837 when Congress authorized the 
establishment of seven hospitals (three on the Mississippi River, three on the Ohio, and one on 
Lake Erie).263 The MHS further expanded after its reorganization in 1870, and it began to 
establish quarantine hospitals and conduct health inspections of immigrants.264 In 1879, it 
provided free physicals for all seamen.265 The MHS offered relief to watermen, and that action 
was confirmed in 1886 when the Service asked the Solicitor for the Treasury Department 
weighed in on the issue because “applications for relief began to be received from fishermen, 
claiming that as their vessels paid tonnage duty they became contributors” and were entitled to 
relief.266  Soon the service expanded beyond the marine. For example, starting in 1914 it began 
to conduct rural sanitation work, mostly focusing on education.267 The MHS became so diverse 
in its scope that Surgeon General John B. Hamilton, in his introduction to the Service’s 1889 
annual report, called for the name of the Marine Hospital Service to be changed to reflect its 
growing public health role.268 The Service changed its name to the Public Health and Marine 
Hospital Service in 1902.269 
 The episode in Southern Maryland, then, occurred within a wider context of MHS 
expansion. The codification of medical professionalism granted the service the cultural authority 
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to begin to advocate for expanded powers and a more interventionist role.270 The last quarter of 
the nineteenth century saw the most robust expansion of the Service’s powers. With the addition 
of quarantine and immigration inspection to its mission, the MHS migrated away from serving 
only merchant marine seamen. In 1871, at the time of the reorganization of the Service, the MHS 
had 71 facilities; in 1880 this had increased threefold to 210.271  
 
Views of Seamen 
Seamen have unique characteristics that caused the federal government to provide for 
their medical care. Initially, the care given by MHS centered on merchant marines returning from 
foreign ports.272 This is a result of shipping’s interconnectivity to other economic pursuits. More 
so than other industries, international trade is closely linked to governmental policy and national 
independence. A strong merchant marine fleet maintains a nation’s economic independence, and 
able-bodied seamen mean that there is less need to rely on foreign merchants—as such a 
situation could leave the American economy to the whims of a potentially hostile government. 
Robert Straus states in Medical Care for Seamen: “[I]n reality, the shipping industry is an 
instrument of state policy.” 273  The War of 1812, after all, was largely caused by the 
impressment of American sailors.274 Providing for the health of seamen was considered a 
national concern because the seaman’s job was accepted as necessary for the public good.275 
Society needs commerce to function; economies cannot grow without access to foreign goods to 
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stimulate growth and return profits. The merchant marine was, then, an essential job and a brutal 
one, but the hazards were considered natural to the job.276 It served the nation’s interest to have a 
strong cadre of merchant seamen. By doing so, a nation could ensure a degree of economic self-
sufficiency and so maintain its status as a politically independent nation on the world stage.  
By coincidence, this national independence was ensured by a profession that prized 
above all else its independence. As discussed in Liberty on the Water Front the seaman 
profession attracted those that held “disdain for the daily routine of land-based labor.”277 As 
shown in Chapter I, many men turned to the water in the nineteenth century not for the money—
of which there was little to be made—but for the freedom the water offered.278 This freedom also 
disassociated seamen from any political geography; the permanent migration of seamen meant 
they lacked any of the anchors—family and property—of land-based living.  
 The geographic and cultural ties that defined most individuals in society, and which were 
especially important to people in need of social assistance, proved problematic for seamen. 
Seamen were, in fact, essentially homeless and considered by many to be national dependents.279 
A sailor’s lack of social ties and a dispersed geographic spread led to two phenomena. First, it 
caused sailors to gain reputations as reckless spendthrifts, men who could not integrate into 
society and instead crowded its edge. Quite literally they were often limited to a municipality’s 
riparian zone, as many cities introduced ordinances to restrict the movement of sailors to the 
docks. 280 Because seamen had no geographic ties, they were unable to claim the benefits of 
almshouses or locally run hospitals, as these institutions limited their demographic of service to 
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the citizenry of their locality. Compounding this, sailors were not renowned for their financial 
planning—their reputation as drunken spendthrifts was not unearned—and would rarely have the 
means to purchase medical care for themselves.281 The otherness of seamen excluded them from 
access to health care, despite being in a trade with a high chance of injury and an even greater 
chance of disease. Maryland oystermen had this reputation as rapscallions as well; John 
Wennersten describes how “those who visited Crisfield [a major oystering center, and the second 
largest city in Maryland] in the 1870s found a raw, riotous community with saloons and brothels 
filled with lusty watermen.”282  
Secondly, ill seamen also posed a threat to the health and welfare of the public. Because 
seamen traveled to foreign ports, they were perceived to be walking creatures of contagion, 
importing exotic illnesses from the Torrid Zone.283 Ports were shut down and cities ruled by fear 
with news of cholera outbreaks. During the outbreaks in Europe of 1832, 1849, and 1866, New 
York City became restless and fearful that the disease would sail across the Atlantic and attack 
the American citizenry.284 Dangers of this kind, foreign threats introduced through benign 
means, were quick to stir up public fears and force government intervention. Providing sailors 
with a source of medical care served as a way to mitigate the threat these potential carriers of 
foreign plagues posed to society.  
In the nineteenth century, there were two reasons why the government provided medical 
care to a specific group. The group was owed medical care as a reward for services rendered, 
such as the case with veterans, or the group was deemed incapable of providing for themselves, 
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such as with Native Americans and freed slaves. Seamen straddled both categories, through their 
duty in maintaining the economy sovereignty of the nation and being unable to care for 
themselves as a result of their nomadic state. 
The MHS view of seamen was far more charitable than most other organizations. Both 
Walter Wyman and William Marsh were sympathetic to the plight faced by Maryland’s oyster 
dredgers.  For example, Marsh laments in his 1893 report that many captains refused to grant 
oystermen access to his station.285 Marsh even admits he was surprised there were not more 
cases of pneumonia “among this class of poorly fed, thinly clad [men].”286 Where other people 
focused on the drinking, illicit sex, and fighting of seamen, the MHS was concerned only with 
their medical well-being. 
The MHS viewed its mission as not only to provide medical care for seamen as directed 
by Congress, but also to advocate for their protection in general. The First Annual Report of the 
MHS, 1872, recommended that the scope of the MHS medical demographic be expanded to 
include “revenue cutters, coast survey vessels, vessels of the Engineering Corp of the Army, and 
the Light-House Board.”287 In its 1875 report, the Service applauded Congress for acquiescing to 
the MHS’s request to expand the definition of seamen that qualified for MHS assistance: “As far 
as the service is concerned [author’s emphasis], any person employed on board in the care, 
preservation, or navigation of any vessel, or of those engaged in such care, preservation, or 
navigation.”288 This also highlights the flexibility the MHS took to interpreting Congressional 
directives to ensure that the widest range of individuals would qualify for MHS coverage and 
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shows that the MHS was actively seeking ways to provide more protection to those engaged in 
maritime employment.289 The Service did not verify that it could provide care to watermen until 
1886, despite having already done so for years.  
The service also expanded the care it could provide by requesting the construction of new 
hospitals. In 1872, for example, the Service requested that Congress authorize the construction of 
hospitals at “New York, Baltimore, New Orleans, Cincinnati, Cairo, Vicksburg, Norfolk, 
Galveston, Savannah, and Port Townsend.”290 After a decade Congress finally appropriated 
funds for the establishment of a hospital in Baltimore; though the appropriation was made in 
1882, construction was delayed until 1884 as the Maryland General Assembly had to approve the 
transfer of land from state to federal control.291 Already, the MHS was making use of its 
professionalized bureaucratic independence to expand the scope of its mission.  
This was expedited in part by how the MHS viewed seamen. Contrary to the Maryland 
Board of Health and other state agencies, the MHS focused less on their rough nature and instead 
focused the exploitative aspects of their employment.292 In 1884 Walter Wyman (then Surgeon 
for the Baltimore Hospital) commented on the abuses and poor working conditions of dredgers in 
Maryland (as described in Chapter I):  
 
 
                                                 
289 In so much, as that the MHS interpretation of the law was broad enough to incorporate all individuals employed 
on a vessel, including “cooks, porters, or waiters.” (Ibid.) 
290 “Annual Report of the Supervising Surgeon General of the Marine Hospital Service of the United States, for the 
Fiscal Year 1881,(G.P.O., 1882), 14. 
291  Annual Report of the Supervising Surgeon General of the Marine Hospital Service of the United States for the 
Fiscal Year 1890. (Washington, DC: G.P.O., 1890), 23. 
292 Second Biennial Report of the State Board of Health of Maryland. January, 1878. 33–36.; Gilje, Liberty on the 
Waterfront, 13.; This is not to suggest that they did not understand some of the rougher aspects of the seaman’s life. 
Full aware of their life style it is of little surprise that in the First Annual Report the Service had a paper entitled 
“Stricture of the Urethra.” United States Marine Hospital Service, First Annual Report of the Supervising Surgeon 
General of the Marine Hospital Service of the United States for the Year 1872., 123. 
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A large number are capable of the greatest brutality, and I have heard it freely 
asserted by men who should know, that many a dredger has been knocked 
overboard and drowned by an angry captain, because dissatisfied with his work, 
or to avoid the penalties to which the kidnapped man might subject him on return 
to port, or to stop a troublesome demand for wages.293 
 
The Doctrine of Assumed Risk—the idea that workers accepted all health risk upon 
accepting employment—was not to be used by the Service as justification for turning a blind eye. 
While praising the MHS expansion of power under Congress’s reorganization of the Service, the 
First Annual Report notes that “in the absence of legal supervision, abuses have grown so 
flagrant and demoralizing.”294 The issue of “advanced wages” was a continued and notably non-
medical concern of the MHS. Similar to share-cropping in the Reconstruction South, advanced 
wages was a practice where a boarding house overcharged seamen for room, board, and, of 
course, rum while they waited for employment and then sent them “penniless to the sea.”295 The 
1881 Report refers to this practice as “blood money,” claiming that “crews are bought and sold 
like cattle.”296  In addition to the abuses of wage, the Service also worried that the employment 
of seamen who had “never been physically fit for the duties” persisted.297 Though the MHS was 
concerned about the nature of seamen’s employment, it was only authorized to provide medical 
care to seamen, not regulate the nature of their employment. This exhibits that the MHS was 
engaging in more Progressive thinking about the causes of the health issues facing seamen in the 
Gilded Age. 
                                                 
293 Wyman, “Hardships of the Coasting Trade, and Particularly of the Chesapeake Bay Oystermen,” 277. 
294  First Annual Report of the Supervising Surgeon General of the Marine Hospital Service of the United States for 
the Year 1872., 132.; An Act to reorganize the marine hospital service, and to provide for the relief of sick and 
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Acutely aware that the MHS served as only a treatment, but not a cure for many of the 
health problems facing seamen, it lamented that there was little in the way of regulating for the 
safety of seamen. “Thousands of dollars are properly spent through the lifesaving service, in 
saving the lives of persons . . . but, we have as yet no public provisions looking to the prevention 
of disaster.”298 That is to say that the MHS could do little to control the nature of seamen’s 
employment, or their actions on the land—much to the chagrin of many special reports 
examining treatments for venereal disease. The MHS saw the scope of its potential action limited 
to the grounds of its hospitals and relief stations. Despite advocating for expanded powers to 
provide for the care of seamen, the individuals it saw were largely at a disadvantage and in 
danger of abuse. The service could only intrude so far without political approval.   
 
The Marine Hospital Service on the Bay 
How, then, did this care get extended to the oyster dredgers of the Chesapeake? In 
Maryland, there were three, and occasionally four, MHS facilities, the largest being the hospital 
in Baltimore City.299 Before 1887, the Baltimore location operated out of St. Joseph’s Hospital in 
the northern part of the city, but in 1882 Congress appropriated $100,000 for the construction of 
an MHS hospital in the city.300 The Baltimore Hospital itself was constructed primarily to serve 
as a quarantine station, but also filled the role of a relief station by providing out-patient services. 
In 1889, for example, the Baltimore hospital treated 1,800 patients.301 However, what is of 
                                                 
298 Annual Report of the Supervising Surgeon General of the Marine Hospital Service of the United States, for the 
Fiscal Year 1881, 15. 
299 There were locations at Crisfield, Cambridge, and Annapolis in addition to the Solomons Island and Baltimore 
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300 Annual Report of the Supervising Surgeon General of the Marine Hospital Service of the United States for the 
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interest to this thesis is the creation of the Marine Hospital Service’s Third Class Relief Station 
(no.332) at Solomons Island. This station’s creation was not, as was the case with the Baltimore 
hospital’s construction, to fulfill multiple roles (in the case of Baltimore this was for inspection, 
quarantine services, and relief). The station at Solomons—initially referred to as Patuxent 
Harbor—was put in place solely to serve oystermen, and specifically the industrialized dredger, 
of the Chesapeake.  
A few factors played a role in bringing this medical service to the Bay. Dr. Walter 
Wyman, who as the Supervising Surgeon in Baltimore, became well acquainted with the plight 
faced by oyster dredgers.302 He reported on their condition in a presentation to the American 
Public Health Association in 1884.303 However, Wyman saw this as part of a larger problem. The 
conditions on skipjacks presented a great chance for injury and disease. He noted a discrepancy, 
while every deep-sea vessel was required to provide protective clothing to its crew, “no law 
compels any oyster captain to look thus to his men.”304 He highlighted the harsh conditions of 
the Chesapeake and the danger it posed to the oysterman’s health. “The men’s labor is all upon 
the open deck, where their clothes may be kept wet and frozen by the spray . . . it would be 
strange if pneumonia and rheumatism were not frequent among them.”305 He pointed to the past 
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two years (1882 and 1883) when fifty oystermen sought treatment at the Baltimore hospital for 
frostbite and over thirty for the dreaded oyster hand.306  
He recounted the case of James Belfield, who in November of 1882 was struck in the 
stomach by his windlass and lost the use of his legs.307 Belfield might have, perhaps, been spared 
permanent disability if, Wyman sardonically noted, he had received prompt treatment, but “it 
was deemed more important to get a full load of oysters.”308 
 While Wyman acknowledged that the reality of the oyster dredger’s life included many 
health threats, he suggested that there should be some government intervention to mitigate the 
risks. The injuries faced by dredgers were a result of the technology used: the dredge and 
windlasses. The dredge and windlass made oystering far more deadly than tonging, “It is this 
deadly instrument that I would call more earnest attention to than all the other combined 
hardships.”309 He was, however, cognizant of the reality of the situation facing dredgers. Their 
injuries are not the results of an “exceptional disaster,” but “a day pointed to by the hand of 
probability.”310  Wyman was well aware of the many limits placed on workplace safety in the 
Gilded Age, and was perhaps thinking of how the MHS could intervene to assist oyster 
dredger.311 “Surely the state of Maryland might demand . . . that no sick man . . . shall be 
allowed to lie in the miserable forepeak, but shall be promptly carried to the nearest port, where 
relief shall be obtained.”312 To be sure, 1880s America was not a bastion of occupational health 
protections. The same year as Wyman’s report Congress considered creating a bureau to track, 
                                                 
306 Ibid., 277–78. Oyster Hand occurred when a cut received from an oyster shell became infected and was often 
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312 Wyman, “Hardships of the Coasting Trade, and Particularly of the Chesapeake Bay Oystermen,” 281. 
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not prevent and most definitely not treat, labor injuries.313 For Wyman and the MHS, the Gilded 
Age ideas of the fellow servant rule, contributory negligence, and assumed risk would not be 
used to justify failing to provide for the care of oystermen. 
 In an 1889 letter, Wyman announced that he found a “temporary shelter hospital during 
the ensuing three months for the relief of the sick and disabled [oystermen].”314 One such 
location could be “the mouth of the Patuxent River.”315 The revenue cutter E.A. Stevens had 
arrived in Baltimore three months earlier, along with four other vessels, set to be 
decommissioned and disassembled.316 The ship was transferred—by order of Treasury Secretary 
Windom—to the Marine Hospital Service and retrofitted to serve as a floating hospital.317 
 
Figure 11 & 12: The Stevens Iron Steam Gun-Boat Naugatuck (previously named Gunboat Cutter E.A. Stevens), now at Fortress Monroe. 
Illustration from Harper’s Weekly, 1862. Naval History & Heritage Command. | Profile view of the Civil War gunboat Cutter E.A. Stevens, 
showing her internal space arrangement. Drawing. Naval History & Heritage Command. 318  
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 This was to be a grand experiment: to see if a floating hospital, under the medical care of 
Dr. James Stoner, could meet the needs of the Chesapeake’s dredgers.  By the end of January, 
the Stevens arrived at Drum Point in the Patuxent River, that location being “the chosen haven 
for oyster vessels in bad weather” making it the “most advantageous for the boat to be stationed 
for rendering medical aid.”319 That season the hospital had 176 men apply for treatment, of 
which 18 had to stay for inpatient care.320 In fact, on the day the Stevens arrived in the Patuxent 
Harbor “six or eight unfortunate dredgers presented themselves for treatment.”321 The Stevens 
was in an ideal spot to provide medical relief to dredgers because over a three month period—
half an oyster season—176 men received treatment at the floating hospital.322 James Stoner 
concluded his report by stating that there are more injured men either still able to work, or are 
being held captive aboard their ships “in hopeful expectation of an early recovery.”323  
 Wyman’s belief that there was a medical gap in the Chesapeake proved to be true. The 
Stevens provided medical service to dredgers who otherwise would not have been able to receive 
treatment—the closest station to the Patuxent was in Crisfield, forty miles away on the other side 
of the Chesapeake. Moreover, it was decided that a permanent station was needed to provide 
relief for oyster dredgers in the southern Chesapeake Bay. 
 On October 20, 1890, Dr. William M. Marsh was made Acting Assistant Surgeon for the 
Solomons Island Relief Station of the Third Class (no. 332). One advantage of this location (fig. 
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13 & 14) was that the steamer St. Mary’s made its way from Solomons Island to Baltimore every 
Monday and Thursday, and could transport any oysterman requiring more advanced treatment to 
the Baltimore Hospital with relative ease.324 When interviewed for an 1891 article for the 
Calvert Gazette, Dr. Marsh expressed his confidence that the station would become widely used 
once its existence became well known, and felt that its contract would be renewed for the 
following year. The article closed by noting that “the Surgeon General is understood to be in 
favor of making it a permanent station.”325  
In the 1890-91 season, the Solomons Station treated 219 oystermen.326 The following 
season 538 men applied for treatment at Solomons with 32 admitted for overnight care (two of 
whom died). 327 In 1893, 417 men applied for treatment at the Solomon’s Stations. To place this 
number in perspective, the total number of seamen treated in the Southern Atlantic District 
(which encompassed Maryland, Virginia, North and South Carolina, and Georgia) for that year 
was 8,863, and within Maryland the MHS treated 2,568 people. In 1893, the Solomons Island 
Station treated almost a fifth of all the applications to the MHS for Maryland.328 It is evident that 
the Solomons Relief Station served as a critical medical facility for the Chesapeake 
oystermen.329  
In his report on the station's activities, Dr. Marsh opens by stating: “I can testify to the 
fact that the life of the oyster-dredger as described by Surgeon Wyman was under, rather than 
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over, drawn.”330 He noted that “a better location could not be found” and that “on Sunday it is no 
unusual sight to see 300 or 400 vessels lying in anchor in the harbor.”331 Solomons Island not 
only was close to productive oyster grounds, but it also provided shelter in inclement weather 
and a location where dredgers could replenish their store and seek repairs, “there being several 
stores and two artesian wells from which they can be supplied, besides three 
shipyards.”332Additionally, as Marsh noted, Marine Hospital Relief Station no. 332 was the only 
medical facility within miles of Solomons; in fact, when performing serious operations, he often 
had conscripted the rest of the crew to act as assistants.333  The most common complaint brought 
to the hospital was bronchitis, with 191 cases in 1893.334 The most applicants he received in a 
single day was 21, on a Sunday. (Sundays were “a red-letter day for sick calls.”335) For those 
oystermen submitting to the station for the treatment of an injury the two most common were 
injuries caused by the windlass and oyster hand.336  
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Figure 13 & 14: Current Map of Solomons Island.  Map from MapQuest, 2017. | Plan of Town Lots, Solomons 
Island, Calvert County, Maryland.. 1893. Courtesy of the Paul L. Berry Reference Library at the Calvert Marine 




 This is not to suggest that the local population welcomed the relief station’s presence. In 
1904 the Official Board of Solomons (which was actually the local church council) requested 
that the relief station be moved. Undoubtedly, the negative stereotypes of oystermen was on the 
board’s mind when it noted that the “location of the Marine Hospital” was “detrimental to our 
church property” and requested a new site be found.337 The MHS response was a definitive no.338 
In their minds, the relief the station provided was clearly more important than the concerns of the 
local populace.  
 The location of the Solomons Island Relief Station was so ideal that surveys were 
conducted on nearby Hog Island on the St. Mary’s County side of the Patuxent River for a 
possible MHS Quarantine Station. Ship owners considered its location more desirable than one at 
the mouth of the Chesapeake as that was “too far from the city [Baltimore].”339 Initial 
inspections of the island by the MHS deemed it an excellent location for such a station.340 
Unfortunately, the station was never constructed, for the owner of part of Hog Island refused to 
sell his property to the federal government.341 This failed episode shows that he MHS had an 
interest in expanding its presence in the southern Chesapeake, and had to advocate for such an 
expansion. The Treasury Department had already allocated $41,000 for the construction of the 
Hog Island station before the sale of the land was confirmed!342 
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Figure 15: A map of the mouth of the Patuxent River, with Hog Island circled in green, and Solomons Island circled 
in red. Image from: Charts of Maryland Oyster Survey, 1906-1912. Maryland Shellfish Commission, in cooperation 




 That the Solomons Island Relief Station was established is indicative of the forward 
momentum of the MHS, correlated to its new professional and bureaucratic organization. By 
placing physicians in command, the service was able to respond to health issues in a moderately 
preemptive manner. It is evident from reading the reports of Wyman and Marsh that these new 
professional leaders engaged in the Progressive tradition of applying their scientific knowledge 
to solve problems of public health. Through the floating hospital experiment with the E. A. 
Stevens, they used quantitative evidence to justify the establishment of a permanent station on 
88 
 
the Patuxent River. The Service had responded to a health crisis that was developing among the 
Maryland oyster dredgers. 343 
 Also, of importance is to note how the Solomons Island Station was funded. After 1884 
the MHS relief fund was abolished, and the MHS was funded by the federal government through 
the collection of a tonnage tax.344 Considering how these situations normally existed, it is highly 
likely that ship captains made up for this tax by taking it out of their seamen’s’ pay. However, 
this tax was only levied on ships entering the U.S., not on those on its insular waters. Thus, for 
the Maryland oyster dredger the federal government, through the Marine Hospital Service, was 
providing medical relief through what amounted to a publicly funded medical apparatus.  In the 
case of the MHS establishing hospitals and stations on the Bay, and across the whole nation, we 
have a clear instance of a tax-supported medical service providing medical relief to a 
demographic that lacked access to care. This provision of care is a continuation of viewing the 
seamen, of which the dredger was now included, as a national dependent.345 In this case, the 
word national deserves particular attention because it is the federal, not state, government that is 
providing the care.   
As has been shown, the MHS had several factors that enabled it to step in and fill the 
health dangers being faced by oystermen in the southern Chesapeake Bay. The Service was 
initially created to protect the health of the United States merchant marines. This purview 
quickly expanded to include almost all seamen in the United States by the start of the twentieth 
century.346 Thus, over the nineteenth century, the MHS’s momentum of expansion of care 
allowed individuals to direct that expansion to fill specific health gaps, momentum that Dr. 
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Wyman used to expand care in the Chesapeake Bay. Though its service mission expanded over 
time, the goal was still limited in scope. Where the Maryland Board of Health’s mission was to 
“have general care of the sanitary interest of the people,” the MHS’s prime directive was always 
to “provide for the relief of sick and disabled Seamen.”347 This focused mission allowed the 
MHS to zero in on its medical demographic. Where the Maryland Board of Health had to 
contend with the sanitation of Baltimore and the policing of the state’s medical professionals, the 
Marine Hospital Service only had to worry about providing care for seamen.  
 Alongside this was the MHS reorganization into an independent professional medical 
organization in 1870. After this, the Service was able to leverage its newly granted professional 
autonomy to establish the Solomons Relief Station, along with other stations around the country.  
During the decade after its reorganization, the number of MHS stations increased by almost 
three-hundred percent to 210 by 1878.348 The vast majority of these stations were of the Third 
Class; in 1877 there were 143 such stations.349 This professional independence, built upon the 
newly formed cultural authority of the medical profession allowed the MHS to move resources to 
provide medical care where it deemed it necessary.350 
 The creation of the Solomons Island Station took place within a larger expansion of the 
service into insular areas. The expansion of these smaller stations was credited in the 1878 
Annual Report with reducing graft, as many persons would be admitted into the hospitals “for 
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the treatments of ailments which did not require hospitalization.”351 Nor was Solomons Island 
the only case of a station being constructed in an area that was not frequented by merchant 
vessels. The service also had stations in, for example, the fishing town of Waldoboro, Maine and 
as far inland as Moorhead, Minnesota (along the Red River). This expansion of smaller stations 
showcases a massive enlargement of the professional bureaucracy of the MHS, the result of this 
was that the MHS became more efficient and effective in delivering care. “The number of offices 
or out patients of the service has gradually increased year by year . . . as a natural consequence 
the number of hospital cases has measurably diminished with a corresponding increase in their 
gravity.”352 Thus, the case of the Solomons Island Relief Station can be understood within a 
greater bureaucratic expansion, the only difference being that this specific expansion was well 
documented. 
Whereas other stations in Maryland (Baltimore, Crisfield, and Annapolis, all at various 
times) were established due to their connection with foreign shipping, fulfilling the MHS original 
goal of treating seamen on international ships. The Solomons Island Relief Station was explicitly 
established to treat the insular oyster dredger. Walter Wyman sent the Stevens into the Patuxent 
for on purpose: to be a “temporary shelter hospital during the ensuing three months for the relief 
of the sick and disabled [oystermen].”353 One can see this instance fitting in with the MHS 
expansion of the term seamen, “As far as the service is concerned, any person employed on 
board in the care, preservation, or navigation of any vessel, or of those engaged in such care, 
preservation, or navigation,” and as part of its evolution into the Public Health Service.354 
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  Instead of operating within the confines of Gilded Age non-intervention ideology on 
industrial health, MHS officials such as Walter Wyman saw it as their duty to provide for the 
welfare of those industrial laborers working in unsafe conditions. Despite concerns over the 
treatment of these men, the MHS lacked the authority to improve their working conditions; it 
could, however, provide post-triage care where preventative regulation was not in place. It was 
not just MHS officials that saw this health gap. In powerful and eloquent language the Baltimore 
Sun laid the blame for these dangers on the business conditions which allowed such cruelty to 
flourish, a result of the “selfish brutality” endemic to the industry which created the conditions 
for this health gap.355 
 With the reorganization of the Service by Congress in 1870, new privileges offered by 
new professional standards let the MHS focus on providing care for seamen. The Service’s 
annual reports are filled with statistics tracking their relief in minute detail, while also providing 
insight into how to improve medical care through case studies and reports on new procedures.356 
These reports show a dedicated and professional class of doctors focused on their directives as 
outlined by Congress. They also indicate that the MHS was eager to expand its care group, as it 
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did in 1872 when it urged Congress to expand the definition of seamen.357 Walter Wyman’s 
1884 paper calling attention to the plight facing dredgers in the Chesapeake, lamenting that they 
are “compelled to work at all hours and in all weather, sick or well,” supports this conclusion.358 
In sending the Stevens to the Patuxent Harbor at Drum Point in Solomons Island, Maryland, the 
MHS was fulfilling its goal of providing relief to seamen but was also acting in a way unique for 
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Over its forty-one year span, the Marine Hospital Service Third Class Relief Station at 
Solomons Island (no. 332) provided medical care to 11,381 people.359 By the 1920s, however, 
the number of men seeking relief was declining as a result of the mechanization of labor, which 
led to smaller crews, and the depletion of many oyster beds, which resulted in fewer skipjacks on 
the Bay.360 Even with declining enrollment of patients, the Marine Hospital Service (MHS) 
justified the continuation of the station because it was the only medical facility in the area.361 
When the owner of the property (C. Davis) decided not to renew his lease at the end of the 1930 
oyster season, Dr. William Marsh chose to retire (he was 79 at the time).362 In light of this, the 
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Figure 16: The last location of the Solomons Island Relief Station at 3 Davis Street. It is now part of the University of Maryland’s Chesapeake 
Biological Laboratory. Photo courtesy of the Paul L. Berry Reference Library at the Calvert Marine Museum. 
 
This thesis has sought to explore the nature of government-run medical relief in the late 
nineteenth century by examining the MHS’s creation of the Solomons Island Relief Station in 
Maryland. Because of the economic importance of the oyster industry, the government of 
Maryland considered the Bay an economic entity in addition to being an environmental place. 
This consideration divided the Bay into two zones of extraction and split that labor into tonging 
and dredging.364  
The Chesapeake Bay as a workspace was hazardous to both tongers and dredgers. The 
environment of the Bay offered a number of natural hazards that both tongers and dredgers 
equally faced. First among the environmental hazards was exposure. With the oyster season 
running through the “r” months (October-April) the risk of exposure, and especially frostbite, 
were constant. In January 1886, in Baltimore City’s Bay View Asylum had one-hundred cases of 
oystermen with frostbite, in a single day.365 However, on the skipjack dredgers faced a second 
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layer of risk. The skipjack was a dual construct, being a creation of the Bay’s environment and 
the political will of Maryland. With the General Assembly forbidding the mechanization of 
dredging, the skipjack was designed to take full advantage of the wind and for maximum 
maneuverability.  
This anti-mechanization also extended to the act of dredging; oyster dredgers had to 
operate the windlass without an assistance or power. Injury from the windlass was the most 
common cause for a dredger to seek medical relief.366 The workplace of the skipjack relied not 
on skilled seamen, but unskilled or semi-skilled workers. This organization made dredging an 
industrialized affair. Dredgers were not experienced oystermen; they were hired for the season 
and, unlike the tonger, did not own their equipment and lacked that connection to nature that 
tongers enjoyed.367 Because of this dredgers faced both environmental and industrial health 
threats. Unfortunately for dredgers, nineteenth  century ideas of  assumed risk, contributory 
negligence, and the fellow servant rule largely absolved management from being held 
responsible for workplace injuries.368 
This industrialized workspace was essential for coding how the Maryland Board of 
Health and Bureau of Industrial Statistics interpreted the dangers facing dredgers. In keeping 
with Gilded Age thought, both these agencies found the cause of injuries and diseases lay with 
the workers, not with the nature of their work. In its 1878 report on the poor health of oystermen, 
the Maryland Board of Health noted that: “Mentally they are ignorant, superstitious, and dull.”369 
Ten years later, in an examination of the “Sickness Among the Laboring Classes” the Board fully 
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accepted the idea of contributory negligence, stating: “there are numerous cases where classes of 
workmen sustain injury to their health from want of pre-caution[sic].”370 
This episode on the Chesapeake Bay falls within a wider narrative of the issues in 
regulating an industrial economy and the development of welfare policies. Morton Keller, in 
Affairs of State describes industrial regulation in the late nineteenth century as a state where the 
government was suspended between old preindustrial, or traditional, values and the new 
industrial economic reality.371 These traditional values, while advantageous for the independent 
trade smiths like tongers, did not translate into providing security for industrial wage laborers. 
Prioritization of laissez-faire capitalism injected a pro-employer bias into America’s legal 
framework. While powerful local party machines and a democratic distrust of centralized elites 
made introducing federal regulations difficult.372 Even within Maryland there existed this 
tension, with the locally rooted tongers resisting intrusion from state officials, the result was the 
creation of county and state waters.373  
Ideas of who deserved to receive social protections also limited the range of choice for 
the Maryland Board of Health.  Theda Skocpol’s Protecting Soldiers and Mothers shows the 
heavy partisan role in establishing welfare organizations.374 Social support and economic 
subsidies for service institutions was embedded within the patronage system, and with one-
quarter of the U.S. budget going to pension services, this represented a large locus for political 
influence or reward.375 This situation resulted in a system where “[t]he only Americans forced to 
be ‘hardy individuals’ . . . [were] men who were not fortunate to enjoy party patronage,” a 
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system that “helped many Americans economically, without making them feel like clients of a 
welfare state.”376  
Maryland’s reactions to the health risks oyster dredgers faced were guided by late 
nineteenth century ideas of the role of government and rights of laborers, and falls into a 
nationwide reaction to late nineteenth century industrialization. Contributory negligence, 
assumed risk, and the fellow servant rule were all reactions to this great economic and social 
change; legislatures sought to protect preindustrial ideals that sanctified individualism and 
preserved local economic autonomy. These traditional understandings of employment—the 
fellow servant rule entered American jurisprudence in 1842—are apparent in the Board of Health 
and Bureau of Industrial Statistic’s praise of the rurally located skipjack captains and tongers 
(“Bay men”).377 These ideals implied that “employees assumed all risks ordinarily associated 
with his work.”378 Thus, Maryland used these ideas of workplace safety and the definition of 
oyster dredgers as industrial workers to justify not intervening for their safety. 
By comparison, the MHS did not use contributory negligence, the fellow servant rule, or 
assumed risk to write off the oyster dredger’s health problems. MHS officials like Walter 
Wyman and William Marsh observed that the nature of the dredgers’ employment was the cause 
of these hazards.379  
 This sympathetic view led the MHS to intervene on behalf of the Maryland oystermen. 
Taking advantage of the authority and professional liberty granted by the 1870 reorganization, 
the MHS Solomons Island Third Class Relief Station was established. This was part of an 
expansion of the MHS, as noted in Chapter III from 1870 to 1880 the number of MHS facilities 
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tripled.380 In its First Annual Report, the MHS requested that the scope of its medical 
demographic be expanded to include “revenue cutters, coast survey vessels, vessels of the 
Engineering Corp of the Army, and the Light-House Board.”381 In 1902, the Marine Hospital 
Service became the Marine Hospital and Public Health Service to reflect its expanded duties, and 
in 1912 became the Public Health Service.382 
 The MHS had a singular relief mission and was able to use that singularity to focus its 
energies on filling medical care lapses across the United States. Unlike the MHS, which was 
charged to “provide the temporary relief and maintenance of sick or disabled seamen,” the 
Maryland Board of Health had a broader directive to provide for the “general care of the sanitary 
interest of the people.”383 The Maryland Board of Health, then, executed its mission by working 
to professionalize medicine in the state, improve sewage systems, and prevent the outbreaks of 
contagious diseases.384 Thus, the idea of protecting oyster dredgers (who according to Gilded 
Age thought were responsible for their own health) was not part of its mission. 
 Bureaucracies’ goals are fundamental in the development of policy. Maryland’s 
agencies focused on public welfare through water management and vital statistic collection 
which necessitated that they ignore specific occupational groups. This resulted in the Maryland 
Board of Health continuing Gilded Age conservative ideas on the nature of government health 
regulation and intervention into economic spaces. The Board of Health was also highly 
concerned with professionalizing medicine in Maryland. The Board had a vested self-interest in 
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pushing for improved professional standards in Maryland, because doing so solidified its cultural 
authority. This self-improvement necessitated that a decent amount of energy that could have 
been targeted at addressing health issues in the state instead be focused on self-policing and the 
establishment of professional standards. The Board operated within a strict interpretation of its 
purpose, creating a situation where the MHS felt it necessary to intervene. The MHS espoused a 
more Progressive interventionist view and actively moved to fill a medical care gap on the 
Chesapeake and did so within the context of its expanding professional purview.  Both the 
Maryland Board of Health and the Marine Hospital Service used the cultural authority afforded 
to them as professional organizations to create government policy. 
In this the federal government reacted to the needs of injured and poorly protected 
workers, challenging the notion that the federal government took a hands-off approach to public 
health during the Gilded Age. It must be noted, though, that there were a number of contributory 
factors that allowed this to occur. The economic importance of the oyster industry to the state 
refracted how state-level agencies understood the health risk facing oystermen, and oyster 
dredgers specifically. Recall the concern over Baltimore City’s plan to construct a new sewage 
system (Chapter II). The State Board of Health’s focus was on “[t]he effect that the emptying of 
such an enormous volume of human excrement [from Baltimore] into the Bay would have upon 
the fish and oyster.”385 No Maryland entity could escape the oyster’s importance to the economy; 
one report suggested that 300,000 people’s incomes came from the oyster industry.386 
 This examination of government sponsored medical relief on the Chesapeake Bay has 
exposed some more nuanced questions that could be explored further. This thesis has focused on 
the actions and choices of institutions, in doing so the voice of the oyster dredger has been left 
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muted in the background. Some of that voice is available through newspapers, such as the 
Baltimore Sun, but that voice was curated. It would be useful to gain a deeper insight into the 
opinions of the oyster dredgers. Specific areas to explore could include their opinions of the 
MHS stations in the Bay. 
 Such an exploration would benefit greatly from examining other social factors which may 
have influenced why Maryland’s Board of Health did not choose to intervene on behalf of the 
oyster dredgers. As immigrants accounted a majority of the workforce (with the two largest 
groups being German and Irish), a more minute examination of the demographics of the 
workforce could lead to some new conclusions for why Maryland did not seem to worry about 
the dredgers’ welfare. A further examination of race as part of this question should also be 
considered as African-Americans accounted for about one-third of the oyster industry’s 
workforce.387 Either of these approaches could connect this event to wider understandings of 
ethnicity and race in relation to medical care. Examining the wider discourse of workers’ rights 
when wounded would serve to further incorporate this discussion into the changes brought forth 
in late nineteenth century industrialization. A closer analysis of court cases where dredgers 
attempted to win recompense for injuries suffered on the skipjack would add an additional layer 
of depth to this story, and could serve as another vehicle to giving the oysterman a voice. Finally, 
this thesis did not look at the politics of Maryland. The state has been a Democratic stronghold 
since before the Civil War. Reintroducing the politicians, the General Assembly and governors, 
into this examination would help expose the influences of the oyster industry on policy in 
Maryland. Secondary work such as The Oyster Question alludes to this fact, but showing how 
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political forces worked to prevent the dredgers from receiving medical relief would add another 
layer of depth to the history of the Chesapeake Bay.  
 As the oyster population declined and oyster beds started to disappear, the number of 
skipjacks on the Bay fell. With hauls falling in the twentieth century, in 1928 the season brought 
in only 350,000 bushels. In 1890, 176 men applied for relief at the floating hospital, the E.A. 
Stevens, over a three-month period, in 1930, 95 men applied for relief throughout the entire 
oyster season (1929-1930).388 The closure of the Solomons Island Relief Station in 1930 
heralded the end of understanding the Chesapeake through a nineteenth century lens for 
Maryland. Environmental concerns began to challenge economic priorities of the oyster 
industry.389 As skipjacks ceased to dredge for oysters, so too did the MHS slow its treatment for 
the oystermen. Dr. William Marsh’s retirement in 1930 heralded the end of one form of 
interventionist government policy by professional bureaucrats on the Chesapeake Bay. By 1940 
there were only two MHS facilites on the Chesapeake Bay, one in Cambridge, on the Eastern 
Shore, and the other in Baltimore.390 Like the skipjack, the MHS’s presence on the Bay has 
faded into memory. In 1932 a new professional group with a growing cultural authority arrived 
at Solomons Island to address a new set of heath concern on the Chesapeake Bay: the 
environmental scientist.391  The Solomons Island Relief Station No. 332, once at 3 Davis Street, 
is now part of the University of Maryland’s Chesapeake Biological Laboratory. Fittingly, then, it 
is now used to hold scientific lectures on the health of the Chesapeake Bay. 
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1890 179 2,144 1904 395   1918 210   
1891 219   1905 327   1919 119   
1892 538   1906 328 1,696 1920 115 6,675 
1893 417   1907 258   1921 179   
1894 382   1908 276   1922 129   
1895 344 2,409 1909 371   1923 122   
1896 354   1910 346   1924 108   
1897 453   1911 326   1925 183 6,489 
1898 344   1912 319   1926 206   
1899 396   1913 281   1927 183   
1900 338 3,056 1914 273   1928 193   
1901 379   1915 340 3,773 1929 179   
1902 367   1916 296   1930 95 11,342 





Data Source: Marsh, William. “T27.1 Annual Report of the Surgeon General.” Marine Hospital Service, 1932. 

























































• Contributory Negligence: An employee could not claim compensation form an 
employer for an injury if the said employee was found to be negligent in his actions. 
 
• Cultural Authority: Usually confined to objects, this is the ability to construct truth 
through the control of facts and by defining what is, and is not, of value. 
 
• Cutter: A small ship designed to move swiftly through the water. Most closely 
associated with various port authorities and coastal patrol agencies.  
 
• Doctrine of Assumed Risk: Upon accepting employment an employee assumed all the 
risks associated with said employment 
 
• E. A. Stevens: Laid down in 1844. The E.A. Stevens, also called the Naugatuck, was a 
gun boat with iron armor and saw action during the Civil War. After the war it was 
assigned to patrol the Carolinas as a Revenue Cutter for the U.S. Revenue-Marine, until 
1889 when it was sent to Baltimore to be decommissioned. After its stint as a MHS 
Relief Station it was sold to Henry Brown for $3, 025 in April 1890.   
 
• Fellow Servant Rule: An employer is not held liable for an employee’s injury if another 
employee’s negligence is found to have caused the first employee’s injury. 
 
• Hand: A person employed to work on a ship (not the captain or mate). 
 
• James Stoner: Acting Assistant Surgeon of the MHS on the E.A. Stevens from January 
1889 to April 1890. 
 
• John B. Hamilton: (b. December 1, 1847 | d. December 24, 1898) Surgeon General of 
the Marine Hospital Service (April 1879 – May 1891). 
 
• Merchant Marine: Vessels registered with the United States engaged in commerce and 
carrying goods and passengers in-and-out of U.S. waters. 
•  
 
• Oyster Hand: An infection caused by lacerations from oyster shells. The infection is 
from the Vibrio vulnificus bacteria and characterized by necrosis of the wound. 
 
• Schooner: A type of ship with two or more masts commonly used on the Chesapeake. 
 
• Skipjack: The state boat of Maryland since 1985. With a low freeboard (the distance 
from the water line to the deck), a long beam (the widest section of the boat, on skipjacks 
this ran about one third its length), a centerboard (retractable keel), and a large two sail 
mast the skipjack was perfectly designed to dredge for oysters. The freeboard allowed 
easy access to the water. The large beam and centerboard increased stability. Because the 
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centerboard was retractable skipjacks could also enter shallow waters. The large rigging 
allowed skipjacks to take full advantage of the wind as well. 
 
• Sloop: A type of ship with a single mast commonly used on the Chesapeake. 
 
• Social Authority: The power of individuals and organizations to give commands. 
 
• U.S. Revenue-Marine: Established in 1790 (under the Treasury Department) to enforce 
customs, it was renamed the Revenue Cutter Service in 1894. In 1915 it was combined 
with the United States Life-Saving Service to become the U.S. Coast Guard. 
 
• Walter Wyman: (b. August 17, 1848 | d. November 21, 1911) Surgeon General of the 
Marine Hospital Service (June 1891) and of the Marine Hospital and Public Health 
Service (July 1902- November 1911). 
 
• Watermen: A catch all term for those involved in commercial fishing. 
 
• William Marsh: (b. September, 14, 1851 | d. November 12, 1941) Action Assistant 
Surgeon for the MHS 3rd Class Relief Station at Solomons Island (no. 332) from 1890 to 
1930. He received his M.D. from the University of Maryland in 1876. Afterward he 
worked in Baltimore City’s Bay View Asylum and opened a private practice on 
Solomons Island in 1878. He also kept a recorded climate data from the Maryland State 
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